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Between 2005 and 2008, nineteen of the fifty states of the U.S. reformed the
franchising process for cable television, significantly easing entry into local
markets. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the stag-
gered introduction of reforms,wefind that prices for ‘Basic’service declined
systematically by about 5.5 to 6.8 per cent following the reforms, but we
find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular
‘Expanded Basic’ service. We also find that the reforms led to increased
actual entry in reformed states, by about 11.6% relative to non-reformed
states. Our analysis shows that the decline in price for ‘Basic’ service holds
for markets that did not experience actual entry, consistent with limit pricing
by incumbents. To control for potential state-level shocks correlated with
the reforms, we undertake a sample-split test that finds larger declines in
prices for both ‘Basic’and ‘ExpandedBasic’services in local markets which
faced a greater threat of entry (because they were close to a prominent sec-
ond entrant). Our results are consistent with limit pricingmodels that predict
incumbents respond to increased threat of entry, and suggest that the reforms
facilitated entry and modestly benefited consumers in reformed states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Watching TV is the predominant leisure activity in the U.S., accounting
for about half of leisure time on average for American adults (BLS [2013]).
Cable television plays a very significant role in this activity, with a share of over
60% of U.S. households in 2010 (Nielsen [2011]). For an industry with such a
significant presence in households across the nation, cable television has faced
little competition in many local markets, despite federal reforms such as the
Cable Act of 1992 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that aimed specif-
ically to enhance competition. In particular, based on a 2009 survey, the FCC
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documented effective competition (from either satellite TV (DBS) or a second
wireline operator) for only 31.65% of subscribers (FCC [2011], p. 18), implying
that 68.35% of subscribers did not have competitive offerings to choose from.
Policy measures to boost competition in the cable industry continue to be
debated at the state and federal levels. In this paper, we examine the impact of
one such reform – the deregulation of the franchising process for cable television,
which was adopted in nineteen states of the U.S. between 2005 and 2008. Prior
to 2005, in all but four states, prospective entrants to any local market (termed
as ‘community’) had to negotiate with local municipalities on a case-by-case
basis. Because the local authorities often imposed significant restrictions on the
new entrants, the need to negotiate individually with local municipalities posed
a challenge to potential entrants, with the FCC’s concluding that the ‘local fran-
chising process inmany jurisdictions constitutes an unreasonable barrier to entry
that impedes...cable competition’ (FCC [2006]).
Following deregulation of the franchising process, reformed states allowed
cable companies to receive a single state-wide franchise for providing service
to communities anywhere within the state. By standardizing the terms and con-
ditions that apply to both existing providers and new entrants into this industry,
the reforms effectively liberalized entry by reducing the restrictions typically
imposed on new entrants by local city councils (FCC [2006], FCC [2007],
Bolema [2008]). The significance of the reforms is reflected in the intense lob-
bying and legal efforts undertaken by incumbents to delay the reforms and by
telecom companies (‘Telcos’) in support of the reforms.1
Although these reformswere the subject of strong debate and lobbying efforts,
there has been surprisingly little systematic evaluation of the effect of the reforms,
and anecdotal evidence on the effect of the reforms ismixed.2 In addition to being
of direct policy relevance, studying these reforms provides a unique opportunity
to examine the effects of a reduction in barriers to entry on incumbent behavior.
As pointed out byGoolsbee and Syverson [2008], the effect of an increased threat
of entry has been a topic of interest in the theoretical literature, but has been sur-
prisingly less investigated empirically, as it is difficult to find instances where the
threat of entry went up without necessarily inducing actual entry. More broadly,
the reforms provide a setting to study the effect of competition on firm behavior:
changes in regulatory barriers to entry help overcome the difficult challenge of
finding exogenous sources of variation in the competitive environment (Holmes
and Schmitz [2010]).
Because deregulation was introduced across the nineteen states in a staggered
manner,we are able to adopt a standard difference-in-differences (DID) approach
exploiting variation in the timing of introduction to control for common shocks
1 For anecdotal evidence on the lobbying efforts see news articles by e.g., Reardon [2005a],
Haugsted [2006], Sura [2006] and Sher [2008].
2 Articles about specific states suggesting consumers benefited include Spiwak [2006] (Texas),
Schneider [2007] (Wisconsin) and Rogers [2008] (Michigan), while Kreucher [2008] (Michigan)
and Barrett [2008] (Wisconsin) argue otherwise.
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(Angrist and Pischke [2009], Ch 5). Using a rich micro data set which includes
data on prices of cable television in every local community across the United
States over a seven-year period from 2004 to 2010, we examine whether the
price of subscribing to the two primary service tiers – ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded
Basic’ – declined in response to these reforms.3 Complementing this dataset
with hand-collected data on entry by the two major Telcos, Verizon and AT&T,
we also examine how entry by cable operators and Telcos was affected by the
reforms.
We find that prices for ‘Basic’ service are lower by about 5.5 to 6.8% in states
which have reformed their franchising process for cable television. We find no
effect on prices of the more popular ‘Expanded Basic’ service tier. We confirm
that the DID effects were not impacted by pre-existing trends – the trends in
prices for both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ service in the reformed states were
not different from that in the non-reformed states.
While the Warren’s Television and Cable Factbook database has been exten-
sively used in prior studies (e.g., Rubinovitz [1993]; Goolsbee and Petrin [2004];
DellaVigna andKaplan [2007]; Seamans [2013]), recently researchers have doc-
umented issues with the quality of longitudinal data in this dataset (e.g. Crawford
andYurukoglu [2012];Martin andYurukoglu [2016]). In particular, they find that
data do not appear to be updated regularly for a significant number of cable sys-
tems. While we do not expect the measurement issue to systematically bias our
results against the null of a zero effect for reforms, we undertake three alternative
tests to check the robustness of our results to these concerns about the quality
of longitudinal data. Specifically, we test robustness to including only commu-
nities with at least one price change, to using only sample period means pre and
post-reform, and finally to including cable system level fixed effects.We find the
baseline results robust, with the decline in price of ‘Basic’ service stronger in
one of the tests, and the null effect for ‘Expanded Basic’ remaining unchanged
(both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance).
We also find the baseline results robust to a range of additional robustness
checks. In particular, we find the results robust to including additional controls
for quality of channels offered (in addition to the control for number of channels),
including amortized costs of installation in the price, examining long differ-
ences, restricting analysis to a balanced panel of communities, using alternative
fixed effects, including only principal communities, excluding some sub-sets of
states, and distinguishing multi-system operators from smaller firms. As a fal-
sification test, we check and find no effects using residential, commercial, and
industrial electricity prices. Finally, we find that quantity (measured as number
3 ‘Basic’ cable service, also referred to as the basic service tier (‘BST’), is the minimum level of
cable television service that must be taken by all cable television subscribers. The content of basic
cable service varies among cable systems but, pursuant to the Communications Act, must include
all local television signals and public, educational, and governmental access channels and, at the
discretion of the cable operator, may include other video services. ‘Expanded Basic’ cable service,
offers additional video channels on one or more service tiers (FCC [2009], p. 12).
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of subscribers) went up in response to the price decline, though the estimated
effects are noisy.
We then examine entry, and find evidence of significant additional entry in
reformed states, particularly by Telcos. While raw summary statistics suggest
about 13.3% more communities in reformed states experienced entry, control-
ling for demographic and market characteristics in a linear propensity model,
we find a DID excess entry rate between 7.95% and 13.8% in the reformed
states.
Our findings carry implications for related theoretical literature. As we dis-
cuss in Section III, the theoretical predictions about the effect of a reduction in
costs of entry vary across models (as discussed in detail in Sutton [1991]). For
example, in a model where potential entrants expect Bertrand competition in
the second stage after entry, they would not enter and the incumbent would not
change behavior, as long as sunk costs of entry are greater than zero (which is
very likely the case in our context, as entry requires considerable upfront capital
investment), even if the reforms reduce some costs associated with negotiating
local franchises. In other models (e.g., a model where the post-entry behavior is
expected to be Cournot competition) there is indeed entry, and post-entry prices
are lower than under monopoly. The baseline results on price, and more impor-
tantly on entry, suggest evidence against the Bertrand model and potentially in
favor of the other models.
In this context, an interesting question is whether we should expect any price
declines without actual entry occurring. The models in Sutton [1991], do not
explicitly address this question, but do predict declines post-entry. Milgrom and
Robert [1982a] show that in a world with perfect information, cutting prices
prior to entry does not deter entry, and hence such ‘limit pricing’behavior would
not be a rational equilibrium. However, in a world with asymmetric information
(Milgrom and Roberts [1982b]) or with switching costs (Klemperer [1987]),
incumbents may lower prices before entry to signal lower costs or to lock up
consumers; thus in these models limit pricing can be a rational strategy to deter
entry.
We examine whether there is evidence for ex ante price declines, by exclud-
ing communities which experienced actual entry from the sample. We find that
indeed there is evidence for incumbents’ cutting price in response to just the
enhanced threat of entry: communities without entry have a greater price decline
of 6.57% for ‘Basic’ service, in reformed states relative to non-reformed states.4
Building on this finding that the increased threat of entry led to price declines,
we devise a sample-split (triple difference) test that controls for potential state-
level correlated shocks. In particular, we examine communities in countieswhere
4 Interestingly, comparing communities where there was actual entry, we see no significant dif-
ferences between reformed and non-reformed states. This is unsurprising as most models do not
predict differences between reformed and non-reformed states conditional on actual entry. In fact
this result is reassuring, as it suggests that omitted variables were not driving general price declines
in reformed states.
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a major overbuilder is present.5 Incumbents here are likely to face a relatively
greater threat of entry, as cable overbuilders aremore inclined to enter into neigh-
boring communities (RCN 2005 Annual Report, Seamans [2013]). We find that
there is indeed a greater DID decline in price in communities close to a major
overbuilder; this decline is about 10.6% and statistically significant for ‘Basic’
service, and equally large (10.2%) but statistically less significant for ‘Expanded
Basic’ service. Interestingly, consistent with the observed price cuts, we find
very large and statistically significant increases in number of subscribers for
both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services in communities close to the major
overbuilder. As long as potential omitted shocks, due to unobserved demand
(e.g., due to differential entry by Satellite TV) or cost shifters (e.g., due to local
cost inflation not captured by local income or wages included in baseline con-
trols) are similar across locations within a state, this sample-split result suggests
that reforms did indeed cause changes in incumbent behavior, consistent with
the models that predict ex ante price responses (such as Milgrom and Roberts
[1982b] or Klemperer [1987]).
While our main focus is on the effect of these reforms on prices of various tiers
of cable service, there are a number of other outcomes that could be potentially
impacted by an increase in competition. In particular, the quality of service, as
also the pricing of broadband (internet) service could be impacted; subject to
limitations on availability of data, we briefly examine these outcomes as well.
Consistent with the results in Chu [2010], who finds that the quality of cable
service (measured as number of channels) typically improved in response to
satellite entry, we find some evidence of an increase in quality of service for
the ‘Basic’ tier following the reforms. Thus, incumbent firms appear to have
responded to an increased threat of entry on the service quality margin (and the
observed price declines are not offset or explained by a reduction in the quality of
service).We also find some evidence of a decline in the price of internet service,
again with stronger effects in markets with a higher threat of entry.
Our study contributes to the small literature discussing the effect of cable
franchising deregulation (Spiwak [2006], Schneider [2007], Bohanon and Hicks
[2010]). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to systematically
examine the effects of cable franchise deregulation on prices, and entry using
comprehensive national microdata, and hence the first to document systematic
declines in prices and increased entry in reformed states. The FCC in its periodic
cable price reports examines differences in prices across communities, including
comparison between communities with and without a second cable operator. In
its 2009 report on cable industry prices, it finds that average price of the ‘Basic’
tier is about 10.23 (10.91) per cent lower in 2009 (2008) in communities where
5 As discussed in FCC ([2009], p. 15, footnote 97), the term ‘overbuild’ describes the situation in
which a second cable operator enters a local market in direct competition with an incumbent cable
operator. In these markets, the second operator, or ‘overbuilder,’ lays wires in the same area as the
incumbent, ‘overbuilding’ the incumbent’s plant, thereby giving consumers a choice between cable
service providers.
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there is a second cable operator (‘overbuild’) (Table I, FCC [2011]). Thus our
finding of a range of 5.5 to 6.8 per cent decline in prices suggests an effect in
the range of 50 to 66 per cent of the effect of actual overbuild competition.6
Because we find ex ante price responses by incumbents to the increased threat
of entry, this study relates to the empirical literature on ex ante price reductions
or limit pricing. Although a number of studies have examined ex post responses
by incumbents to entry (Yamawaki [2002], Simon [2005], McCann and Vroom
[2010]), relatively few have examined ex ante responses. In an important con-
tribution, Goolsbee and Syverson [2008] find that incumbents respond to the
threat of entry by a low-cost competitor (Southwest) by preemptively reducing
prices. In work related to ours, Seamans [2013] examines limit pricing behavior
in cable TV markets. Using a novel measure that captures variation in asymmet-
ric information between incumbents and new entrants across markets, he finds
that limit pricing behavior is indeed more strongly prevalent in markets with a
greater degree of asymmetric information, consistent with the model inMilgrom
and Roberts [1982b]. Our work differs in that we focus on inter-temporal varia-
tions in barriers to entry introduced by reform of local franchising regulations.
In addition to testing for the presence of limit pricing, our objective is also to
undertake an evaluation of this important policy reform.
The cable industry provides an interesting setting for empirical work because
there are numerous geographically separated markets. Our work relates to the
broader literature in Industrial Organization that has exploited this setting to
examine various aspects of the cable market including the effect of vertical inte-
gration between programming and distribution (Chipty [2001]), welfare effects
of bundling (Crawford [2008] and Crawford andYurukoglu [2012]), and welfare
effects of new products (Goolsbee and Petrin [2004]).
The paper proceeds in nine sections. Section II provides background on the
industry, regulations, and the state-level reforms that are the focus of this study.
Section III lays out the theoretical underpinnings for our empirical analysis,
while Section IV introduces the data. Section V presents our analysis of the
effect of reforms on prices and provides several robustness checks on our main
set of results. SectionVI examines actual entry following the enactment of these
reforms, and examines whether incumbents responded to increased threat of
entry. SectionVII presents the sample-split test examining communities adjacent
to major overbuilders. Section VIII presents a number of extensions examining
the effect of the reforms on the quality of service, on the price of internet service,
and results from a two-step matching procedure that controls for the potential
endogeneity of these reforms. We discuss results and conclude in Section IX.
6 The findings for the effect of actual overbuild competition on ‘Expanded Basic’ tier is a bit
more nuanced in the 2009 report (FCC [2011]).While the average price of service is only 1.0 (2.39)
per cent lower, consistent with Chu’s [2010] findings for the effect of Satellite entry on number of
channels offered, the 2009 report finds a greater number of channels being offered in the ‘Expanded
Basic’ tier in communities with overbuild competition, so that per channel price is 11.11 (14.49) per
cent lower in communities with actual overbuild in 2009 (2008).
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II. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND, REGULATORY FRAMEWORKAND REFORMS
II(i). Industry Background
For studying the effect of changes in entry barriers, an attractive feature of
cable TV markets is their localized nature, which allows for considerable varia-
tion in the competitive settings across geographic markets. These local markets
are defined by the ‘franchise’ boundary of the incumbent system; typically the
boundary is the geographical boundary of the city inwhich the incumbent system
is based. This effectively segments the U.S. into thousands of non-overlapping
geographic markets.
Historically, a single incumbent cable TV system served each local market.
In their 2009 annual report, the Federal Communications Commission notes
that: ‘Relatively few consumers have a second wireline alternative, such as an
overbuild cable system’ (FCC [2009], p. 5). An earlier FCC Report on Cable
Industry Prices (FCC [2005]) found that cable television service was provided
in 32,510 ‘non-competitive’ communities while there were only approximately
400 communities with competitive wire line ‘overbuilds’ (i.e., with more than
one operator in the market) (Braunstein [2008]).
Although in theory competition from Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) could
have limited the amount of pricing power enjoyed by cable TV incumbents, this
appears not to have been borne out in practice for the period of our study. An
assessment by the FCC in 2009 noted that ‘... in the large number of communities
in which there has been a finding that the statutory test for effective competition
has been met due to the presence of DBS service, competition does not appear to
be restraining price as it does in the small number of communities with a second
cable operator.’7,8
Traditionally, one reason proposed for why most markets remain monopolies
(in terms of wired cable service) is the potentially significant economies of scale
in providing cable service and the large investments required for laying coaxial
cable to the homes of consumers. However, Owen and Greenhalgh [1986] argue
that economies of scale are not so large as to rule out the possibility that com-
petition, either direct or potential, can serve as a significant disciplinary force
in the marketplace. More recently, Kelly and Ying [2003] find that ‘average
cost savings with respect to a monopoly were fairly small, ranging from 1.37%
with a 10%market overlap to 5.05%with a complete overbuild’ (Kelly andYing,
[2003], p. 962).Another significant factor contributing to the persistence of local
monopolies has been local ‘franchising’ regulations (FCC [2006], FCC [2009]),
7 Source: http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2009/db0116/DA-09-53A1.txt.
Accessed on 1 December, 2012
8 Because barriers to DBS entry were related to geographical factors (Goolsbee and Petrin
[2004]), we do not expect entry rates to be correlated with reforms in a way that would bias our
results. Nevertheless in Section VII, below, we discuss a sample-split (triple difference) approach
that could control for shocks correlated with the reforms such as higher DBS entry into reformed
states.
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which have acted as a significant barrier to market entry. We discuss these local
franchising regulations in the next section.
II(ii). Franchising Regulation of Cable Service Providers
Cable companies have been traditionally regulated at the local level. To obtain
permission from local government authorities to operate in a market, firms are
required to agree to a number of terms as part of a ‘franchise’ agreement. Local
governments use these agreements to achieve multiple goals including raising
revenue, providing access to cable TV equitably in the community, andminimiz-
ing disruptions from laying of cable. In particular, some of the key terms relate
to:
• Franchise fees: Franchise fees to be paid annually typically amount to 5% of
the revenue received by cable companies. These can be important sources of
revenue for local governments.9
• Build-out provisions: The desire of local governments to provide access to
consumers everywhere within their service jurisdiction generally leads them
to prescribe build-out requirements where entrants are obligated under the
franchise agreement to cover the entire service area within a prescribed span
of time.
• Public, Education, and Government (PEG) channels to be carried on the
service.
• Service networks to government and educational buildings (I-Net).
• Local agency control over public rights-of-way permits: These terms aim to
minimize disruptions thatwould result fromuncoordinated digging up of roads
and walkways by cable companies.
• Consumer protection through customer service standards and enforcement.
Per the FCC (FCC [2006], FCC [2009]), the local franchising process imposes
significant barriers for potential wireline entrants. In his study, Hazlett [2007]
concludes that the local permitting process delays competitive entry, and depend-
ing on the nature of the administrative process and the terms and conditions
imposed on the potential entrant, franchising may deter entry altogether.
Federal policy makers sought to outlaw anti-competitive build-out require-
ments and prevent discriminatory pricing that limit competition, through the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. However, because municipal franchising
agents were granted immunity from damage awards, there is no effective rem-
edy if regulators impose unreasonable build-out requirements, or fail to enforce
9 A government committee report (Joint Study Committee [1998]) in Georgia documented that
for the 525 governmental units studied, cable franchise fees represented an average of 6.66% of total
tax revenues. A recent estimate for aggregate franchise fees paid by cable operators is $3.2 billion
per year, per the Cable & Telecommunications Association. (http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx
Accessed on 10 December, 2012.)
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uniform pricing rules. An FCC [2007] report found that the franchise process
was being manipulated so that ‘new entrants eager to provide video service are
often delayed, and in some cases derailed, by the unreasonable demands made
by local franchising authorities.’ This report reiterated the findings in an ear-
lier FCC [2006] order, where the Commission concluded that: ‘the operation
of the local franchising process in many jurisdictions constituted an unreason-
able barrier to entry...’ The FCC [2006] order discusses several ways by which
local franchising authorities were unreasonably refusing to award competitive
franchises.These includedrawn-out local negotiationswith no time limits; unrea-
sonable build-out requirements; unreasonable requests for ‘in-kind’ payments
that attempt to subvert the five per cent cap on franchise fees; and unreasonable
demands with respect to public, educational and government access (or ‘PEG’)
channels.
II(iii). Reforms of Cable Franchising Regulation
Given the reality of limited competition in the cable industry, there have been
a number of attempts at both the state and federal level to enhance competition
(Spurgin [2008]).10 These have often taken the form of limiting local govern-
ment’s ability to regulate competitive cable operators and allow for the possibility
of issuing statewide or nationwide cable franchises to companies interested in
providing cable service, whether they be cable or telecom companies.
Although no federal action for nationwide franchising has been taken to date,
twenty-three states have reformed their franchising process to allow for statewide
franchises. Such laws pre-empt the need for new entrants to negotiate individ-
ual franchise agreements with local municipal authorities, and give them the
authorization to launch services anywhere in the state following approval of the
state-wide franchise application.
Table I shows the status of franchise reform in all fifty states, along with the
year of passage for all states that have reformed their franchising process. Four
states, Alaska, Hawaii, Rhode Island andVermont, had state franchising laws in
place prior to 2005; nineteen states passed similar laws between 2005 and 2008.
For the states that have passed state-wide cable television/video franchise laws,
Spurgin [2008] provides a general comparison of key provisions (see Table A1
in the OnlineAppendix) including variations in the franchise fees, requirements
on provision of Public, Educational and Government Access (PEG) channels,
controls on Right ofWay, and build-out requirements by state.We supplemented
Spurgin [2008] by a review of the legislative bills; based on our review, we re-
classifiedVirginia as ‘not reformed,’as the legislation for the state did not include
a provision for a single state-wide franchise. Also, we confirmed passage of the
law for Louisiana, where the legislation was pending per Spurgin [2008].
10 This section draws from Spurgin [2008].
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TABLE I
STATUS OF CABLE FRANCHISE REFORM LEGISLATION IN ALL FIFTY STATES
4 States with laws prior to 2005:
Alaska, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont
19 States that enacted laws in 2005, 2006, 2007, or 2008:
2005: Texas
2006: Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, and North Carolina
2007: California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina,
and Wisconsin
2008: Louisiana and Tennessee
27 States that have not enacted laws:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, NewYork, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming
|
Source: ‘StateVideo Franchise Law: State ofArt or State ofWar?’by Jay T. Spurgin [2008] supplemented by authors’
research.
A number of states set up separate commissions specifically charged with
overseeing the new state franchises. Franchise fees for new service providers
with a state-issued franchise are set by most states to be equal to incumbent fees,
with a maximum amount typically being five per cent of gross revenues. Build-
out requirements under state franchise laws are generally less stringent than
under local franchise agreements. Very few bills to date have included build-out
provisions, and those that do are heavily qualified.11
Given that the critical provisions (relating to granting a state-wide franchise to
the applicant, equating of franchisee fees between entrants and incumbents, and
relaxation of build-out requirements) are similar across the different reformed
states, in our analysis we treat the reforms as a dichotomous variable. As noted
before (in footnote 1), incumbent cable companies lobbied strongly against
franchising reforms, while telecom companies, specifically Verizon and AT&T,
worked to support these legislations.
As discussed earlier, there is little work systematically examining the effect
of the reforms on prices and entry across all reformed states. Bohanon and
Hicks [2010] examine the effect of franchising reforms on number of broadband
connections using FCC data, and they find an increase in broadband subscrip-
tions following the reforms. Anecdotal evidence on the effect of reforms in
particular states has been mixed with some reports of reduced prices after entry
(e.g., Spiwak [2006] (Texas), Schneider [2007] (Wisconsin) and Rogers [2008]
(Michigan)), and other reports of no decline in prices (e.g., Kreucher [2008]
(Michigan) and Barrett [2008] (Wisconsin)).
11 Most state laws that provide for a state-wide franchising authority allow existing local fran-
chise agreements to remain in effect until a new service provider with a state-issued franchise begins
offering service in a community. Many states allowing existing franchises the option to terminate
the local franchise and replace it with a state franchise; some restrict this option to when wireline
competition is present.
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Figure 1
Progression of Reforms across the 50 States
Notes: Based on Spurgin [2008].We recodedVirginia (which had been listed in the report as reformed)
as not reformed because our research shows that the state did not pass legislation allowing for a
state-wide franchise. Also, we confirmed passage of the law for Louisiana, where the legislation was
pending per Spurgin [2008]. |
III. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We view the enactment of reform that allows for the award of a single state-wide
franchise as reducing the barriers to entry in the market for cable TV ser-
vices, by reducing the exogenous, sunk costs associated with entering each local
market.
In a large class of models, reduced (sunk) entry costs could lead to more
entry in equilibrium which then puts downward pressure due to post-entry
competition (e.g., in the Cournot or Monopoly model in Chapter 2 of Sutton
[1991]). However, as Sutton [1991] discusses in Chapter 2, this result hinges on
assumptions about the nature of price competition in the post-entry stage. He
shows for example that assuming homogeneous products and Bertrand compe-
tition in the second stage, a reduction in entry costs does not necessarily attract
new entry, as entrants anticipate price to equal marginal cost post-entry in the
second stage, and this completely deters entry. In fact in the Bertrand model,
changes in exogenous sunk entry costs have no effect on the pricing behavior
© 2017 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
BARRIERS TO ENTRYAND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR 521
of the incumbent, as they charge the monopoly price as long as entry costs are
non-zero.12
In contrast to the models in Sutton [1991], in the presence of asymmet-
ric information about incumbent’s costs (Milgrom and Roberts [1982b]) or if
customers face switching costs (Klemperer [1987]), the theoretical literature
suggests incumbents may change pricing behavior in response to an increased
threat of entry, even before actual entry occurs, as a means to try and deter
entry.13 In Milgrom and Roberts [1982b], incumbents may lower prices to
signal lower costs; because lowering prices is costly, it constitutes a credible
signal to potential entrants. It should be noted that, as Milgrom and Roberts
[1982a] show, cutting prices prior to actual entry is not a rational strategy to
deter entry (or drive out rivals) in a world of complete information (and no
switching costs). Potential entrants would realize that prices are being held arti-
ficially low in order to ward off entry but then once entry does take place, it
is sub-game perfect for the incumbent to accommodate rather than to predate.
In other words, as long as the established firm’s pre-entry price does not affect
post-entry demand or cost (and hence profit), limit pricing would not influence
the potential entrant’s decision to compete in the market. Thus the asymmetric
information assumption inMilgrom andRoberts [1982b] is crucial to get rational
ex ante price cuts to deter entry. Asymmetric information could be relevant in
our context due to cross-industry differences between Telco entrants and cable
incumbents, or participation in industry R&Dconsortia (as discussed in Seamans
[2013]).14
Klemperer [1987] provides another justification for ex ante price cuts – in
his model lower prices help to ‘lock in’more consumers, who are harder for the
entrant to attract because of switching costs. In our context, there may be switch-
ing costs for several reasons. One, it was not unusual for companies to offer one
and even two-year contracts, with an early termination fee. Two, even without
early termination, switching could involve upfront installation fees. Also, lack
of experience with the new service provider may yield a psychic switching cost
due to potential concerns about service quality and customer support. In both
Milgrom and Roberts [1982b] and Klemperer [1987], reducing prices is costly
for the incumbent and so it follows that incumbents may bemore likely to reduce
prices the stronger the threat of entry.
12 Also with product-differentiation, different models yield different predictions about the equi-
librium number of firms in the market after reduction in entry costs. In the Hopenhayn [1992] class
of industry equilibrium models, the effect of reduced sunk costs of entry on the mass of survivors
is ambiguous (Balasubramanian and Sivadasan [2009]), but the cutoff productivity level increases
and consequently, the equilibrium rate of entry (and exit) goes up.
13 The idea of ex ante limit pricing goes back to Bain [1956], who suggested that there may be
a positive relationship between the initial price and the degree of entry – an incumbent firm may
select lower than the profit maximizing price in order to deter entry by competitors.
14 Seamans [2013] argues that variation in membership in CableLabs, an industry R&D consor-
tium restricted to cable companies, is an important source of asymmetric information, and exploits
that in his study.
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To summarize, the effect of reduction in entry barriers on actual entry as well
as pricing behavior of the incumbent is theoretically ambiguous with at least one
model (Bertrand competition model in Sutton [1991]) suggesting possibility of
no effect on prices or actual entry. Other models suggest actual entry and con-
sequent decline in prices (Cournot competition model in Sutton [1991]) while
others predict price declines even without actual entry (Milgrom and Roberts
[1982b], or Klemperer [1987]). Given the varying predictions across different
models, the cable reforms provide an interesting context in which to empirically
investigate the effects of a reduction in entry barriers, specifically: (i) whether
prices were affected, (ii) whether actual entry occurred, and (iii) whether there
was evidence for ex ante price reductions (as predicted by Milgrom and Roberts
[1982b] or Klemperer [1987]).
IV. DATAAND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The primary source of data on cable television service offerings comes from
seven years (2004–2010) of theWarren Publishing’s Television and Cable Fact-
book. The Factbook data is the main source of cable TV system level charac-
teristics used in most empirical studies of the industry (e.g. Rubinovitz [1993];
Goolsbee and Petrin [2004]; DellaVigna andKaplan [2007]; Seamans [2013]).15
This rich data set includes information on monthly prices and installation fees,
the number of consumers subscribing to the various tiers of service, and a list-
ing of the specific channels that are available on each tier of service for each
individual cable system. It also classifies each system as either ‘Operating’ or
‘Overbuild’ where the latter term refers to a competing cable operator building
a cable network system in an area already serviced by an existing cable opera-
tor. Finally, it also provides us the names of the communities which are served
by each cable system.16 While the Warren’s Factbook database has been used
extensively in the literature, there are some concerns about the quality of lon-
gitudinal data in the dataset; we discuss this concern and undertake robustness
checks to check potential bias from related measurement error in Section V(iv)
below.
In addition to data regarding the service offerings,weobtain controls for demo-
graphic variables that might affect either the demand for cable television service
15 It is also used extensively by the FCC. Justifying the use of data from this source, an FCC report
says: ‘Warren collects its data directly from cable television operators or individual cable systems
to create a large database of cable industry information. Warren states that it is the only research
entity that directly surveys every cable system at least once every year, providing the most complete
source of cable data. In fact, the cable systems represented in Warren’s database serve 96% of all
subscribers nationwide.’ (FCC [2009], p. 198).
16 For example, the cable system in Kalamazoo, Michigan, serves not just the city of Kalamazoo
but also towns in the adjoining area such as Alamo Township, Pavilion Township and Comstock
Township. TheWarren’s data includes the names of the principal community (in this case, Kalama-
zoo) as also the names of adjoining communities served by the cable system (in this case, Alamo
Township, Pavilion Township, and Comstock Township).
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TABLE II
SUMMARY STATISTICS – NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES
Reform Status 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
No reform 16,320 16,191 15,622 15,077 14,172 14,221 14,012 105,615
Reform before 2005 512 489 487 470 464 463 466 3,351
Reform between 2005 - 2008 18,805 18,391 17,818 17,379 15,981 16,018 15,723 120,115
Total 35,637 35,071 33,927 32,926 30,617 30,702 30,201 229,081
|
Notes: The lowest level of disaggregation at which data are available from the Warren’s TV Factbook (2004–2010)
is the individual community. Generally the boundaries of a cable community correspond to that of a municipality,
though there may be multiple cable communities within a single municipality and vice versa. The status of reforms
by state is summarized in Table I.
or the cost of providing cable television service or the likelihood of market entry
by a competing service provider. We draw on Savage andWirth [2005] to select
relevant control variables; in particular, the demographic controls include per
capita income (and its square), population density (and its square), local wage
in the ‘Information’ sector (NAICS code: 51), age profile of the population,
and growth in number of housing units. Data on these demographic variables is
available at the county level. Additional information regarding data sources is
provided in the online Data Appendix.
Tables II and III present summary statistics. Table II gives a snapshot of the
number of communities served for each year splitting the sample into the three
different categories based on whether the state enacted franchising reforms, and
when those reforms were enacted. Generally the boundaries of a cable commu-
nity correspond to that of a municipality, though there may be multiple cable
communities within a single municipality and vice versa. As Table II indicates,
there are approximately 30,000 cable communities in the U.S. each year.17
Summary statistics at a similar level of disaggregation on price of ‘Basic’ and
‘Expanded Basic’ tiers of service are presented in Table III. As the fourth row of
Table III suggests, the average price for ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services
stand at $18.98 and $42.02/month for the entire sample period, when averaged
across all states.18 Also, a simple difference in means shows that the increase in
average price for ‘Basic’servicewas 8% lower in the states that reformedbetween
2005 and 2008; these states move from an average price 46 cents above, to an
average price 84 cents below, that for the non-reformed states. The average price
for ‘Expanded Basic’ service moves in tandem in both the states that underwent
reform between 2005 and 2008 and the non-reformed states. These aggregate
17 The number of communities in theWarren’s data change from year to year, with a broad trend
of decline in the number of communities.Warren’s informed us that this was due to consolidation of
communities.As part of our robustness checks (in SectionV(v)), we verify that baseline results hold
for a balanced panel sub-sample of communities present throughout the seven-year sample period.
18 Following a discussion with the data provider, we define the price of ‘Expanded Basic’ as the
sum of ‘Expanded Basic’ service (only) provided in the Warren’s pay tier file with the monthly
price for ‘Basic’ service (only) provided in the Warren’s general information file. This is because
‘Expanded Basic’ access requires purchase of the ‘Basic’ tier as well.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON MONTHLY PRICE OF ‘BASIC’ AND ‘EXPANDED BASIC’ SERVICE
‘Basic’ service ‘Expanded Basic’ service
Average % change Average % change
across the between across the between
Reform Status 2004 2010 sample 2004−2010 2004 2010 sample 2004−2010
No Reform $17.77 $20.35 $19.11 15% $35.96 $46.85 $41.75 30%
Reform before 2005 $17.05 $22.94 $19.39 35% $39.80 $52.79 $46.21 33%
Reform between
2005 −2008 $18.23 $19.51 $18.85 7% $36.31 $47.20 $42.11 30%
Overall $18.00 $19.95 $18.98 – $36.23 $47.11 $42.02 –
Change in reformed states relative = 7% - 15% = 30%-30%
to non-reformed states = - 8% = 0%
|
Notes: Data on cable prices are taken from successive issues of Warren’s TV Factbook (2004–2010). Price data are
available at the level of each individual community. Generally the boundaries of a cable community correspond to
that of a municipality, though there may be multiple cable communities within a single municipality and vice versa.
There are approximately 30,000 cable communities in the U.S. ‘Basic’ service is the level of cable television service
that must be taken by all cable television subscribers. The content of basic cable service varies among cable systems
but, pursuant to the Communications Act, must include all local television signals and public, educational, and gov-
ernmental access channels and, at the discretion of the cable operator, may include other video services. ‘Expanded
Basic’ service offers additional video channels on one or more service tiers and includes most of the better-known
national cable television networks. The price data provided in this table exclude all installation charges and any
charges associated with equipment rental and reflect the monthly subscription charges for an individual consumer.
The status of reforms by state is summarized in Table I.
differences in means presage the results we find with more careful regression
estimates below.
To examine entry by Telcos, we also hand collected data on locations served
by Verizon andAT&T; this data is described in more detail in Section VI below.
V. EFFECT OF FRANCHISING REFORMS ON PRICES
V(i). Empirical Methodology
The staggered introduction of the reforms across different states allows us to
adopt a difference-in-differences approach to estimating the effect of the fran-
chising deregulation.As is standard, we compare the difference in outcomes after
and before the intervention for communities affected by the deregulation (the
‘treated’group) to the same difference for unaffected communities (the ‘control’
group) (Bertrand, Duflo andMullainathan [2004]).We look at the longest period
possible from 2004 through 2010, based on availability of data. However, this
period is also convenient for us since 2004 corresponds to a date when none of
the states, barring four (Alaska, Hawaii, Rhode Island and Vermont) had passed
such state-wide legislation and by end-2008, an additional nineteen states had
reformed their franchising process giving us at least two years after the enactment
of reform to study its effects.
To make an apples-to-apples comparison across different tiers of service (and
as is standard, e.g., in FCC reports on the industry), we look at two tiers of
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service individually – the first tier, ‘Basic’ and the second tier, ‘Expanded Basic’
- prices for which are reported separately in theWarren’s data. Subscribers must
purchase ‘Basic’ service in order to subscribe to ‘Expanded Basic’ service or
to any other tier, or to buy premium programming such as HBO. To be clear,
we define price of ‘Expanded Basic’ as the total price charged to consumers
who subscribe to ‘Expanded Basic’ service, so this incorporates the price for the
included ‘Basic’ tier as well. In our data about 77 per cent of cable subscribers
take both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services; the remaining 23 per cent take
‘Basic’ service only. Because these two tiers of service make up well over two-
thirds of the revenue derived from all tiers of TV programming (FCC [2006] p.
19, FCC [2009] p. 23), we focus on just these tiers for our analysis.
We use the following standard difference-in-differences specification (see,
e.g., Angrist and Pischke [2009], Chapter 5), allowing for a different effect in
the year of the reform:
pijst = α + β1.R0st + β2.Rst + β3.Xit + β4.Yjt + fs + ft + εijst(1)
where pijst is the log of price for community i in state s at time t for the service
offered by company j for a particular service tier. Price varies by service tier and
is logged, following other work on pricing (e.g., Yamawaki [2002]; Seamans
[2013]). R0st is a dummy for year-of-reform which is set to 1 if state s introduced
reforms in year t. Rst is a post-reform dummy which is set to 1 if state s had
reformed in a year prior to year t. fs and ft are state and year fixed effects.19 The
most parsimonious specification includes only these covariates in the analysis.
We then enrich our analysis by introducing more controls. We first intro-
duce time-varying demographic controls for community i at time t in Xit. These
include variables that can affect the prices of cable service either by altering
the demand from consumers (such as per capita income) or the costs to provide
cable service (such as population density) or by altering the likelihood of market
entry by competitors in that community (such as the growth rate of households)
and local wage (for employees in the ‘Information’ industry (NAICS code: 51))
which controls for shifts in cost due to wage inflation (Savage andWirth [2005]).
Thereafter, in Yjt, we also introduce variables corresponding to the characteris-
tics of the cable company providing service in that community, viz., the number
of subscribers it has at the national level, the share of subscribers it has at the state
level, and its vertical affiliation with a content service provider. These variables
are aimed at controlling for economies of scale, market power, and economies
of scope in the provision of cable TV service.
Finally, in our strictest specification, to control for changes in composition or
quality of service we introduce the log of number of channels offered on that tier
of service as an additional control variable. In particular, this control ensures that
19 State level fixed effects generally yielded more conservative estimates and we use this as the
baseline specification. Results using alternative levels of fixed effects, such as county fixed effects,
or community fixed effects are presented in the robustness checks (see Sections V(iv) and V(v)).
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any observed change in prices are not offset by changes in the number of channels
included in the service.20 εijst is the residual error term which accounts for all
unobserved cost/demand shifters affecting prices. The identification assumption
in the DID approach is that shifts in the unobserved variables are similar across
states (so picked up by year effects) or fixed within states (so picked up by state
fixed effects). We explore robustness to introducing more detailed fixed effects
in Sections V(iv) and V(v) below.
Because the reforms are introduced at the state level, we cluster standard
errors at the state level to account for inter-temporal correlation in the error
terms (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan [2004]).21
V(ii). Baseline Price Effects
V(ii)(a). Raw average price trends by reform status. Figures 2a and 2b present
the annual average by reform status for the prices over the period 2004–2010 for
‘Basic’and ‘Expanded Basic’services respectively. Figure 2a shows that average
‘Basic’ prices exhibit a significantly flatter trend in states that reformed between
2005 and 2008 relative to the states that did not reform, so that the relative
price levels change from a premium in reformed states (prior to the reform) to
a discount (after the reform) relative to the non-reformed states, consistent with
the mean price changes documented in Table III. Also consistent with Table III,
Figure 2b shows no change in relative prices for ‘Expanded Basic’ service from
2004 to 2010 between reformed and non-reformed states.22 The results from the
regression analysis discussed below allow us to control for a number of factors
that could impact the simple means plotted in Figures 2a and 2b.
V(ii)(b). Regression results. PanelA of Table IV presents the results from the
regression runs quantifying the effect of reform on the monthly price of ‘Basic’
service and Panel B of Table IV presents the same for ‘Expanded Basic.’ In
column (1), there are no controls other than state and year fixed effects. Column
(2) adds in the demographic controls, namely personal per capita income (and
its square), population density (and its square), the rate of household growth, the
fraction of the population aged between 5 and 18 (as a control for the age struc-
ture of the population) and the local wage for NAICS code, 51 (Information).
All of these controls are available at the county level and are introduced in log
form. In addition, we also include two additional controls for the size of the
average cable system (measured in terms of number of subscribers per cable
20 We explore robustness to additional controls for quality of service in Section V(v) below.
21 We also clustered in both the state and time dimensions for our preferred specifications, follow-
ing Petersen [2009].We found standard errors are smaller than those we obtain by clustering only at
the state level. Given that, to be conservative, we report results clustering on just the cross-sectional
(state) dimension.
22 There is a somewhat surprising increase in prices in reformed states for one year in 2008, but
this reverses in 2009, so by 2010 the prices are back at same levels.
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Figure 2a
Trend in Price of ‘Basic’ Service
Notes: Data on cable prices is taken from successive issues of Warren’s TV Factbook (2004–2010).
Price data is available at the level of each individual community. Generally the boundaries of a cable
community correspond to that of a municipality, though there may be multiple cable communities
within a single municipality and vice versa. There are approximately 30,000 cable communities in the
U.S. The monthly price data used in this graph pertains to that of ‘Basic’ service. This price excludes
all installation charges and any charges associated with equipment rental and reflect the monthly
subscription charges for an individual consumer. ‘Basic’ service is the level of cable television service
that must be taken by all cable television subscribers. The content of basic cable service varies among
cable systems but, pursuant to the Communications Act, must include all local television signals and
public, educational, and governmental access channels and, at the discretion of the cable operator,
may include other video services. The list of states which reformed their franchising process between
2005 and 2008 along with the list of states which did not reform is provided in Table I, and shown
graphically in Figure 1. |
system in the state) and the Designated Market Area (DMA) rank. DMA rank
measures the strength of the local television market and affects demand by prox-
ying for alternative sources of entertainment in the local system area (Crawford
[2000]). Column (3) adds controls for the market structure, viz. the total number
of subscribers the company has nationally, the share of state subscribers for the
company providing service in that community, and a dummy that is set to 1when-
ever the local company is vertically affiliated with a content service provider.
Finally, column (4) adds controls for the quality of service, measured in terms of
the log of number of channels. For brevity, Table IV (and all subsequent tables)
include only the coefficients of interest corresponding to price effects in the year
of reform and in the years following the enactment of reform for the states that
reformed between 2005 and 2008. Full results with coefficients on the control
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Figure 2b
Trend in Price of ‘Expanded Basic’ Service
Notes: Data on cable prices is taken from successive issues of Warren’s TV Factbook (2004–2010).
Price data is available at the level of each individual community. Generally the boundaries of a cable
community correspond to that of a municipality, though there may be multiple cable communities
within a single municipality and vice versa. There are approximately 30,000 cable communities in
the U.S. The monthly price data used in this graph pertains to that of ‘Expanded Basic’ service. This
price excludes all installation charges and any charges associated with equipment rental and reflect the
monthly subscription charges for an individual consumer. ‘Expanded Basic’ service offers additional
video channels on one or more service tiers and includes most of the better-known national cable
television networks. The list of states which reformed their franchising process between 2005 and
2008 along with the list of states which did not reform is provided in Table I, and shown graphically
in Figure 1. |
variables are available on request from the authors. The specifications used in
Table IV are used through the rest of the paper for all regressions which involve
prices of either ‘Basic’ or ‘Expanded Basic’ service.
Depending on which specification is used, we see that the monthly price of
‘Basic’ service is lower by 5.5 to 6.8% in states that have reformed their fran-
chising process as compared to states that have not. Given that the average price
of ‘Basic’ service in 2010 is about $20/month (see Table III), the percentage
decline translates to a drop of $1.10 to $1.36 per month per subscriber or $13.20
to $16.32 per year per subscriber for ‘Basic’ service.
In contrast to the robust evidence of decline in price of ‘Basic’ service, we
do not observe any statistically significant change in the price of ‘Expanded
Basic’ service in any specification in Panel B of Table IV. In columns (1) and
(2), the coefficient on the ‘Post-reform’ dummy is close to zero; in columns (3)
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TABLE IV
DID EFFECT OF REFORM ON PRICE OF ‘BASIC’ AND ‘EXPANDED BASIC’ TIERS OF SERVICE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: ‘Basic’ service
Year of reform −0.0229∗∗ −0.0237∗ −0.0264+ −0.0241
(−2.06) (−1.95) (−1.48) (−1.39)
Post-reform −0.0553∗∗∗ −0.0603∗∗∗ −0.0684∗∗∗ −0.0578∗∗
(−2.95) (−2.85) (−2.94) (−2.26)
Number of observations 211,500 183,253 181,704 181,637
R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.27 0.44
Panel B: ‘Expanded Basic’ service
Year of reform −0.00435 −0.00776 −0.00236 0.00144
(−0.21) (−0.35) (−0.10) (0.066)
Post-reform 0.00134 0.00358 0.0171 0.0212
(0.042) (0.11) (0.50) (0.63)
Number of observations 137,180 121,369 120,653 120,637
R-squared 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.27
Demographic controls N Y Y Y
Controls related to market structure N N Y Y
Control for number of channels N N N Y
|
Notes: Data on cable prices are taken from successive issues of Warren’s TV Factbook (2004–2010). Price data are
available at the level of each individual community. Generally the boundaries of a cable community correspond to
that of a municipality, though there may be multiple cable communities within a single municipality and vice versa.
There are approximately 30,000 cable communities in the U.S. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.
Demographic controls: Personal per capita income (and its square), population density (and its square), the rate of
household growth, the fraction of the population aged between 5 and 18, and the local wage. All of these controls
are available at the county level and are introduced in log form. They also include controls for the size of the average
cable system (measured in terms of number of subscribers per cable system in the state) and the DMA rank. Controls
related to market structure: Number of national subscribers, the share of state subscribers for the company providing
service in that community, and a dummy that is set to 1 whenever the local company is vertically affiliated with a
content service provider. Control for number of channels include log of number of channels provided on that tier
of service. ‘Year of reform’ is a dummy variable that equals 1 for states which reformed between 2005 and 2008 in
their year of reform. Thus, for example, for California which reformed in 2007, this dummy variable assumes the
value 1 for that year and that year alone. ‘Post-reform’ is a dummy variable that equals 1 for states which reformed
between 2005 and 2008 in the years following the reform. Thus, for example, for California, this variable assumes
the value 1 for years 2008 through 2010. ‘Basic’ service is the level of cable television service that must be taken
by all cable television subscribers. The content of basic cable service varies among cable systems but, pursuant to
the Communications Act, must include all local television signals and public, educational, and governmental access
channels and, at the discretion of the cable operator, may include other video services. ‘Expanded Basic’ service
offers additional video channels on one or more service tiers and includes most of the better-known national cable
television networks. The price data provided in this table exclude all installation charges and any charges associated
with equipment rental and reflect the monthly subscription charges for an individual consumer. Robust t statistics,
clustered by state, in parentheses + p < 0.15, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
and (4) after addition of demographic controls and log number of channels, the
estimated coefficient continues to be positive but is not significant in any of the
specifications.23
23 It could be noted in Table IV that the number of observations for ‘Expanded Basic’ prices is
lower, reflecting availability of data in theWarren’s database.We checked to see if sample differences
were salient in explaining different results for ‘Expanded Basic,’ by estimating results for ‘Basic’
service on the ‘Expanded Basic’ sample. We found the results qualitatively similar, with coefficient
magnitudes only slightly lower – a 4.8% decline in the column (4) specification compared to a 5.8%
decline in the full sample. Thus differences in the sample do not appear to explain the differences in
results for ‘Expanded Basic.’Also, we checked and verified that the proportion of observations for
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In the sections below, we check robustness of the finding of a post-reform
decline in the price of ‘Basic’ service to a number of different concerns.
V(iii). Checking for Pre-Existing Trends
A fundamental concern in any DID analysis is the possibility that the observed
mean effects are driven by differences in pre-existing trends. In particular, a
declining trend in prices for ‘Basic’ service in those states that reformed their
franchising process between 2005 and 2008 could lead to the observed mean
decline documented in Table IV. We address this concern in two ways.
First, in Appendix Table A2, we specifically examine the trend in price of
‘Basic’ service prior to the reforms.24 The regressions include only observa-
tions prior to the reforms, and we include dummies for two years and one year
before the reform – all other pre-reform years are absorbed into the constant. The
results reveal that, once we add in demographic controls (column (2)), there is
no significant declining trend (as the coefficients on Reform year - 1 and Reform
year - 2 are both relatively small and statistically insignificant). Once we add in
additional controls for market structure and number of channels (column (4)),
the magnitude of the coefficients on Reform Year - 2 and Reform year - 1 are
both very small and statistically insignificant. Thus relative to the period prior
to two years before the reform, the price in the two years just before the reforms
is within 0.2% in Reform year - 2 and within 0.7% in Reform year - 1, which
suggests no prior declining trend in prices of ‘Basic’ service.
We expand on this to estimate and plot coefficients on an index relative to year
of reform, as suggested inAngrist and Pischke ([2009], Chapter 5). In particular,
we estimate the following regression:
pijst = α +
5∑
k=−4
λk .Rkst + β3.Xit + β4.Yjt + fs + ft + εist(2)
where all the variables are as defined in (1), and index Rkst equals one if state s
in year t is k years from the reform for states that reformed between 2005 and
2008; for example, for California, which reformed in 2007, R−2st is equal to one
for year 2005 and zero otherwise.25
In Figure 3, we plot the coefficients λk for k = – 3 to k = +4, to observe
trends before and after the year of reform, conditioning on demographic controls,
market structure variables, and the number of channels. As the figure suggests,
there were nomarked pre-existing trends prior to the enactment of these reforms;
‘Expanded Basic’ was very similar (66% and 63% respectively) for states that reformed between
2005 and 2008 and non-reformed states.
24 All Appendix Tables are presented in the online Appendix.
25 For the states that reformed prior to 2005 we set the index to 20 so that they are effectively
excluded from the range of indices plotted in the figure.
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Figure 3
Trend in Price of ‘Basic’ Service in Reformed States, around ReformYear
Notes: The per cent numbers on the vertical axis are log points relative to prices for the year
- 4 (i.e., four years prior to reform). The underlying regression includes all controls included
in column (4) of Table IV including state and year fixed effects, controls for market structure,
demographic controls and control for number of channels. See notes to Table IV for details on
individual control variables. Data on cable prices is taken from successive issues of Warren’s TV
Factbook (2004–2010). Data plotted are for three years prior to the enactment of reform and for four
years after the enactment of reform. This graph is based on all communities, including states which
reformed between 2005 and 2008, states which did not reform, and stateswhich reformed prior to 2005.|
in fact the trend over the period −3 to −1 remains remarkably flat. Figure 3 also
shows there is beginning of a decline in prices in the year of the reform, and then
within three years of the passage of these reforms, the price of ‘Basic’ service
is significantly less than its level prior to the enactment of the reforms and it
continues to be lower subsequently.
To see if prior trends could explain the lack of results for ‘Expanded Basic’
service, we undertook the same test as in Table A2 for this tier. The results,
presented in Appendix Table A3, show that there were no differential trends in
‘Expanded Basic’ price in the pre-reform period in reformed states relative to
non-reformed states. In fact, the differential effects are very small, statistically
insignificant, and less than 1.6% across all the different specifications.
V(iv). Potential Data Quality Issues
The choice ofWarren’s Factbook as the primary source of cable price and quan-
tity (number of subscribers) data for our paper stems from its widespread use in
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empirical studies of the industry (e.g. Rubinovitz [1993]; Goolsbee and Petrin
[2004]; DellaVigna and Kaplan [2007]; Seamans [2013]) and because of its rich-
ness: it includes information on monthly prices and installation fees, the number
of consumers subscribing to the various tiers, and the specific channels available
on each tier of service for each individual cable system. No other source that we
are aware of provides such rich data. Furthermore, the cable systems included in
Warren’s database cover 96% of all cable subscribers nationwide (FCC [2009],
p. 198) providing us with nearly universal coverage of all cable systems in the
country, and as noted earlier (footnote 15), it is used extensively by the FCC.
Crawford andYurukoglu [2012]who also use theWarren’sFactbook data how-
ever point to potential data quality concerns about time series variationwithin this
dataset. In particular, the authors document that observations for cable systems
in the Factbook are often not updated. In recent work, Martin and Yurukoglu
[2016] document how findings in a prominent paper (DellaVigna and Kaplan
[2016]) are significantly impacted by use of an alternative dataset (Nielsen) that
has more updated information on channel availability.26 However, as Crawford
andYurukoglu [2012] also note, the lack of updates to the Factbook data is likely
to induce classical measurement error, so that ‘unobservable characteristics of
cable systems that impact whether an entry in the Factbook is up-to-date’ are not
likely to be correlated with ‘the demand they face and/or their pricing behav-
ior.’ Likewise, we also believe that it would be unlikely for measurement error
from infrequent updates to be correlated with the reform status of the state in
such a way as to systematically bias us towards finding the negative effects we
document for ‘Basic’ service prices.27
Nevertheless, in order to address the concerns regarding data quality,weunder-
take three alternative tests. In the first test, we only include communities for
which there is at least one change in price for that tier of service over the sam-
ple period. Our second test examines the average price for each tier of service
in the pre-reform and in the post-reform period using only one observation per
period (pre-reform and post-reform). In our third and final test, we explore alter-
native specifications in which we introduce cable system fixed effects (identical
to principal community fixed effects) or community-level fixed effects so that
locations where entries were not updated get absorbed, and only communities
with changes over time contribute to the estimate. Results from these three tests
are provided in PanelA of TableV for ‘Basic’ service and in Panel B of that table
for ‘Expanded Basic’ service.
26 Specifically Martin and Yurukoglu [2016] document severe mismeasurement of Fox News
availability in DellaVigna and Kaplan [2007]; they find that nearly 40% of the ‘control group,’ the
locations that DellaVigna and Kaplan consider as not having cable access to Fox News in 2000, did
in fact have cable access to Fox News, with the mismeasurement induced by non-updation of data
in the Warren’s TV Factbook database.
27 We also verified empirically that the likelihood an observation is updated in theWarren’s dataset
is indeed uncorrelated with the reform status of the state. Nevertheless, as noted by a referee, if
there were a true relative downward trend in reformed states, non-updation would bias our estimates
towards zero, so the noisy null effect on ‘Expanded Basic’ could be induced by measurement error.
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TABLE V
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS TO ADDRESS POTENTIAL DATA QUALITY CONCERNS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Effect of reform on price of ‘Basic’ service
Base Specification −0.0553∗∗∗ −0.0603∗∗∗ −0.0684∗∗∗ −0.0578∗∗
(−2.95) (−2.85) (−2.94) (−2.26)
Test 1: Including only cable head-ends where
there is at least one price change
−0.101∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.0953∗∗∗ −0.0903∗∗∗
(−3.49) (−3.18) (−2.83) (−3.09)
Test 2: Considering the average price in the −0.0495∗∗∗ −0.0632∗∗∗ −0.0688∗∗∗ −0.0406∗
pre-reform and in the post-reform period and
including only one observation for each period
(−2.77) (−2.92) (−3.17) (−2.21)
Test 3: Introducing alternative Fixed Effects at the
• Cable system level
• Community level
−0.0618∗∗∗ −0.0625∗∗∗ −0.0651∗∗∗ −0.0635∗∗∗
(−3.14) (−3.20) (−3.21) (−3.32)
−0.0581∗∗∗ −0.0515∗∗ −0.0534∗∗ −0.0533∗∗∗
(−2.78) (−2.59) (−2.61) (−2.89)
Panel B: Effect of reform on price of ‘Expanded Basic’ service
Base Specification 0.00134 0.00358 0.0171 0.0212
Test 1: Including only cable head-ends where
there is at least one price change
(0.042) (0.11) (0.50) (0.63)
0.0215 0.0305 0.0318 0.0383
(0.63) (0.98) (1.07) (1.33)
Test 2: Considering the average price in the −0.00657 −0.00487 0.00977 0.0197
pre-reform and in the post-reform period and
including only one observation for each period
(−0.29) (−0.20) (0.37) (0.75)
Test 3: Introducing alternative Fixed Effects at the
• Cable system level
• Community level
−0.00149 0.000352 −0.000153 −0.000792
(−0.045) (0.013) (−0.0055) (−0.029)
0.00280 0.00678 0.00650 0.00409
(0.078) (0.21) (0.20) (0.13)
Demographic controls N Y Y Y
Controls related to market structure N N Y Y
Control for number of channels N N N Y
|
Notes: Coefficients presented in columns (1) through (4) correspond to various combinations of control variables. The
dependent variable in Panel A (Panel B) is the monthly price data for accessing ‘Basic’ (‘Expanded Basic’) service.
This price excludes all installation charges and any charges associated with equipment rental and reflect the monthly
subscription charges for an individual consumer. All regressions include year fixed effects and state fixed effects
unless mentioned to the contrary. Demographic and market-structure controls are as in Table IV. Reported estimates
are coefficients on the Post-reform dummy, which is a variable that equals 1 for states which reformed between 2005
and 2008 in the years following the reform (see Table I for a full list). For test 2, for states that never reformed or
states that reformed prior to 2005, we consider the average price over the period 2004–2007 as the ‘pre-reform’ price
and the average price over the period 2008–2010 as the ‘post-reform’ price. Robust t statistics, clustered by state, in
parentheses + p < 0.15, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The baseline results continue to hold in each of the three tests described above;
in particular, we observe a negative and statistically significant decline in the
price of ‘Basic’ service following the enactment of the reforms, while there are
no statistically significant changes in the price of ‘Expanded Basic’ service. In
fact, the results in the second row of Panel A suggests that when we limit the
estimation to only those observations where there is at least one change in price
between the period 2004–2010, the decline in the monthly price of ‘Basic’ ser-
vice following the reforms is substantively larger, in the range of 9.0–10.0%
compared to the 5.5–6.8% we observe in the baseline specifications. This sug-
gests that measurement error is a concern here but that measurement error is
likely to induce a downward bias on our coefficient of interest.
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Finally, we also attempted to obtain alternative sources of data to examine
the robustness of the results that we report in the paper using Factbook data.
We were fortunate to obtain hand-collected data, very graciously shared with
us by Ali Yurukoglu, collated from (a) prices posted on websites and saved in
the Internet Archive (b) prices posted in newspapers, and (c) those provided in
‘rate cards’ by cable companies. However, two important differences between
Warren’s and the hand-collected data limit the comparability of analysis across
the two data sources. First, the number of observations is significantly lower in
the hand-collected data, especially for the ‘Basic’ service tier for which we find
declines in theWarren’s database. Specifically, the hand-collected data have only
1,709 observations for the price of ‘Basic’ service for the entire sample period
2004–2010 whereas, using theWarren’s Factbook, we have 44,483 observations
for the price of ‘Basic’ service at the cable system level, or over 25 times more
than in the hand-collected data. Second, there are systematic differences between
the coverage of communities in the hand-collected data and those in the Fact-
book. For example, the median population density of counties for which price
data exist for either ‘Basic’ or ‘Expanded Basic’ service in the hand-collected
data is about 550 persons per sq. mile, whereas the population density of coun-
ties for which price data exist in the Factbook is about 100 persons per sq. mile.
Consistent with the FCC [2009] quote on the extensive coverage for Warren’s,
the population density for the country is about 89 persons per sq. mile, closer
to that of the Factbook sample. Similarly, the median Designated Market Area
(DMA) rank (which measures the strength of the local television market) in the
hand-collected data is 29 compared to 58 in the Factbook data.
Notwithstanding these concerns limiting comparability of the two data
sources, we examined the effects of these reforms using the hand-collected data
(Appendix Table A4). Consistent with our baseline results, the increase in aver-
age price for ‘Basic’ service was $2.67 less per month in states that reformed
between 2005 and 2008 compared to states that never reformed. Considering
the average price for ‘Basic’ service over this period, these summary statistics
suggest that the reforms resulted in a substantial 21% decline in the price of
‘Basic’ service over the period 2004–2010. By contrast, there was a decline of
only $1.57 per month (or 4%) in the price of ‘Expanded Basic’ service using
these data.28
Beyond examining the summary statistics, we also examined the effects of
the reforms in a regression set-up as in specification (1). Unfortunately, the
28 One point to note is that, comparing Appendix Table A4 to Table III, while the raw average
prices levels for the ‘Basic’ service inAli’s hand-collected data are close to that in theWarren’s data
(e.g., average price of $19.51 in reforming states for 2010 in Warren’s compared to $20.77 in Ali’s
data), the mean price for ‘Expanded Basic’ is significantly lower in the Warren’s data (e.g., average
price of $47.20 in reforming states for 2010 inWarren’s compared to $56.36 inAli’s data), suggest-
ing potential mismeasurement may be more severe for ‘Expanded Basic.’As we acknowledge in the
conclusion, this measurement error could be one explanation for the null effect of reforms we find
on the price of ‘Expanded Basic’ service.
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estimates were noisy and not statistically significant but the standard errors were
large enough that they did not rule out the effects we report in this paper on the
basis of Factbook data. These additional results are available from the authors
on request. Because the Warren’s Factbook data are more representative of the
country as a whole, we focus primarily on that dataset throughout this paper.
Further, the number of robustness checks in the next section and the num-
ber of additional analyses we undertake (e.g., of entry in Section VI(i), of limit
pricing in Section VI(ii), a triple-difference test of the effect of increased threat
of entry on prices and subscriber numbers in Section VII), provide a series of
sharp additional checks of the soundness of the baseline results. In particular,
measurement error in prices in the Warren’s data is unlikely to be related to
potential error in how entry is measured in theWarren’s data, or in measurement
of Telco entry which was hand-collected by us. Similarly, we believe the triple
difference analysis in Section VII, which examines variation of prices in com-
munities adjacent to overbuilders relative to other communities across reformed
and non-reformed states, is highly unlikely to be biased by measurement error
from prices being infrequently updated.
V(v). Decline in Prices for ‘Basic’ Service: Robustness Checks
In this section, we check robustness of the finding that prices declined for ‘Basic’
service using a number of alternative tests. Results for tests RC1 to RC9 are sum-
marized in Appendix Table A5; results for the remaining tests are presented in
other Appendix tables.
V(v)(a). RC1: Alternative controls for service quality. The observed reduc-
tion in price is economically meaningful only if it was not offset by reduction in
the quality of the service offering. In column (4) of Table IV, our specification
includes the log of number of channels, which controls for adjustments in terms
of addition or deletion of channels. However, cable operators could respond by
dropping more popular channels and adding less popular ones, so that the qual-
ity of offering declines while the total number of channels stays the same (For
example, Crawford [2000] finds that cable operators changed composition of
offerings in response to the 1992 Cable Act). To address this concern, in rows
2, 3 and 4 of Table A5, we include alternative measures to control for changes
in composition of ‘Basic’ service. In row 2, we include log of the number of
channels that are distributed nationally to systems via satellite (also known as
satellite channels), in row 3 we include log of the number of channels that are
within the top 10 most popular channels, and finally in row 4 we include log
of the number of channels that are within the top 20 most popular channels.29
29 Satellite channels include some of the most easily recognizable names in cable, such as MTV,
CNN, and ESPN. The list of most popular channels is drawn from Crawford andYurukoglu [2012]
which in turn, is based on ratings from Nielsen Media. For Nielsen Media, the ranking of channels
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We find the baseline results to be robust; in fact in rows 3 and 4, including con-
trols for the top 10 and top 20 channels yields stronger results, suggesting that
the composition changes in programming quality in reformed states may have
reinforced, rather than offset, the decline in prices.
V(v)(b). RC2: Including installation charges. The economic significance of
the observed decline in prices, particularly for new consumers switching into
cable, could be affected by concurrent changes to installation fees. To check
whether changes to installation fees offset the decline in monthly price, we look
at the net price of receiving ‘Basic’ service in which we amortize the installation
fees over a 12-month period and add that to the monthly price. Results for net
price of receiving service are presented in row 5 of Table A5. While the price
drop reduces slightly, it remains statistically significant and ranges from 4.6 to
5.6%. It appears that installation fees increased slightly in reformed states, but
note that because the average cable consumer is likely to have her installation
for a period that is longer than 12 months, amortizing installation fees over a
12-month period is likely to understate the decline in prices brought about by
the reforms in these specifications.
V(v)(c). RC3: Long differences. If there is some lag in the response to the
reforms, or if incumbents changed behavior prior to the reforms once passage
of the law became more certain, then the DID regressions could give smaller
estimates than the true long-run effects of the reforms. To get at the more long-
run effects, we use a long difference approach (similar to Donohue and Levitt,
[2001]). In particular, we rerun baseline regressions including only data for the
starting and ending years of the sample, i.e., for 2004 and 2010. As expected
(and consistent with the pattern in Figure 3), the estimates in row 6 of Table A5
are uniformly larger, ranging between 7.5–9.8% suggesting that the longer run
impact of these reforms may be larger than the about 6% estimate we find in our
baseline analysis.
V(v)(d). RC4: Balanced panel. The results thus far have been estimated on
all available data. Because of consolidation of cable systems over the years, there
are fewer cable systems in the later years of the sample, so that the panel in the
baseline analysis is unbalanced. To ensure results are not driven by composi-
tional effects, we examine robustness to using a balanced panel of communities
that were present in all seven years of the data. The estimates (in row 7 of Table
A5) yield somewhat stronger results (a decline of about 7.1–8.1%) relative to
the baseline.
is based on the national average cumulative rating for that channel during the fourth quarter of 2006;
given that we have data from 2004 to 2010, this corresponds to roughly the mid-point of our sample
period.
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V(v)(e). RC5:Alternative fixed effects. The baseline regression includes state
fixed effects in every regression, as the effects of state-level reforms are identi-
fied from cross-state and time variations, and hence the main omitted variables
that concern us are state-level variables. Nevertheless, we explore an alternative
specification in which we introduce county fixed effects. We continue to see
a drop in the price of ‘Basic’ service by approximately 6%. Results involving
cable system fixed effects (identical to principal community fixed effects) or
community level fixed effects were presented earlier in Table V and considered
with these results involving county fixed effects, we see that the price decline
for ‘Basic’ service is robust to the inclusion of various alternative fixed effects.
V(v)(f). RC6: Principal communities only. TheWarren’s data includes infor-
mation on all communities served by a cable head-end, with the location of the
cable head-end designated as the principal community. Because in non-reformed
states and in reformed states prior to the reform, the local franchising regulations
operated at the community level, our baseline analysis uses observations on all
communities. In this robustness check, we exclude all these communities that
are served by the same cable system and limit our analysis only to the principal
communities where the cable head-ends are located. Even though this causes
our sample size to drop to about 20% of the original sample size, our results
hold with somewhat smaller magnitudes with this sub-sample as well (in row 9
of Table A5).
V(v)(g). RC7: Alternative control groups. In the baseline analysis, we have
included the four states which reformed prior to 2005 (Alaska, Hawaii, Rhode
Island andVermont).Althoughwe allow the effects for these states to be different
in the post reform period in the baseline analysis, we explore the robustness of
our results to excluding these four states altogether (in row 10 of Table A5), and
find the estimates similar to the baseline.
Further, in the baseline, the control group of non-reformed states includes
the states of Alabama, Utah and Virginia which have laws on their books pro-
hibiting municipal electric utilities (MEU’s) from cross-subsidizing their entry
into the cable TV business.As Seamans [2012] shows, incumbent cable systems
located in such states are less likely to upgrade equipment even though they
may face entry from a municipal entrant because the latter are legally prevented
from cross-subsidizing entry into the cable TV business. In order to preclude the
results from being affected by these states, we exclude these three states from the
analysis (in row 11 of TableA5), and find that the results are largely unchanged.
Finally, the control group of non-reformed states includes the states of
Alabama, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire and Oklahoma which have
‘level playing field’ laws on their books. As Hazlett [2007] argues, these level
playing field laws impose far harsher costs on competitors than on the incumbent
and have the effect of forestalling competitive entry into the local cable market.
Because we expect the existence of such laws on the books to impact the price
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of cable service in such states, we examine the robustness of the results to the
exclusion of these states from the control group (in row 12 of TableA5) and find
the results to be similar to baseline.
V(v)(h). RC8: Distinguishing multi-system operators from smaller firms. The
two new entrants during the period of analysis, Verizon and AT&T, overlapped
disproportionately with a number of large multi-system operators (MSO’s) who
were growing and becoming more efficient during this time period. Therefore,
in this robustness check, we introduce company-year fixed effects for each of the
five largest cable operators (Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Charter Communi-
cations, Cox Communications, and Cablevision Systems) along with a dummy
variable for each operator. Our results are robust to the inclusion of such fixed
effects in the regressions and suggest that price declines following reforms were
across the board and not confined exclusively to the largest MSO’s.
V(v)(i). RC9: Analysis within states with Telco competitor presence. Here we
check the robustness of the results to using only those states where key com-
peting Telcos (Verizon and AT&T) had a presence. If these Telcos were present
disproportionately in reformed states, and were getting more aggressive, then
the baseline estimates may be confounded by the impact of increased aggres-
siveness on the part of Verizon and AT&T. The results in row 14 of Table A5
suggest that the magnitude of the effects are similar within states with the pres-
ence ofVerizon orAT&T, suggesting that the baseline effects were not driven by
a general increase in Telco aggressiveness, and that the reforms resulted in lower
prices of ‘Basic’ service even within states where either Verizon or AT&T were
present.
V(v)(j). RC10: Falsification test using electricity prices. It could be the case
that the price decline for ‘Basic’ service is driven by relatively larger price
declines in these states due to other reasons, or because of increases in prices
in the non-reformed states (driven by say, increases in income or changes in
business climate in ways not captured by our demographic controls). To address
this concern, we conduct a falsification test in which we consider the change
in the average electricity prices paid by residential, commercial, and industrial
consumers over the same period of time from 2004 to 2010 across all 50 states.
If other shocks were negatively impacting prices in reformed states or positively
impacting prices in non-reformed states, then those should also be reflected in
the electricity prices paid by residential, commercial, and industrial consumers.
As the results in Appendix Table A6 show, we find no evidence of a relative
decline for either residential or commercial or industrial electricity prices. In
fact, the coefficient on the ‘Post Reform’ dummy is positive, very small (aver-
aging less than 1%) and statistically indistinguishable from zero in all the four
specifications of this table.
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V(v)(k). RC11: Effect on number of subscribers. In Appendix Table A7, we
check if observed price declines led to increases in the number of subscribers
for ‘Basic’ service. The results suggest an increase in the number of consumers
who subscribe to just the ‘Basic’ tier which is consistent with the observed
price decline. However, the effect is not statistically significant. There appears
to be a greater magnitude of increase (7.4%) in column (3), but this appears to
be explained partially by changes to the number of channels, as the magnitude
declines to 2.8% in column (4).Also, it appears that during the same time, despite
no evidence of a decline in price, there is a statistically insignificant increase in
the number of subscribers to ‘Expanded Basic’ service.
V(v)(l). Robustness checks for price of ‘Expanded Basic’service. To examine
if the finding of a null effect on the price of ‘Expanded Basic’ is robust, we
also undertake all of the checks RC1 to RC9 for ‘Expanded Basic.’ Results are
presented in Appendix Table A8; we find the null effect result for ‘Expanded
Basic’ remarkably robust across all the different checks.
VI. ROLE OF ENTRY
The stated objective of the reforms allowing for franchising at the state level was
to increase the incidence of competition in the localized cable television markets
and bring lower prices to consumers.30 However, as discussed in Section III, the
theoretical effect of lowering of entry barriers in this context is ambiguous, given
that entry still required significant upfront (sunk) investments, especially for the
‘last mile’ connections to residences (e.g., see Wagter [2010]). In particular, as
discussed earlier, in a model with Bertrand price competition in the second stage
(Sutton, [1991], Chapter 2), rational firms would not enter as long as upfront
costs were greater than zero, as they anticipated zero profits in the post-entry
stage. Thus, whether actual entry occurred is an interesting empirical question.
In this section we examine two questions. First, in Section VI(i), we examine
whether the reforms spurred greater entry, especially by Telcos, who lobbied for
the passage of the reforms in many states. (e.g., see news articles by Sher [2008]
and Haugsted [2006]). Second, in Section VI(ii), we examine whether observed
baseline price results were driven by post-entry price declines, orwhether there is
evidence for ex ante price declines even without entry (as predicted by Milgrom
and Roberts [1982b] or Klemperer [1987]).
One hurdle to studying entry is that data for Telcos offering TV services is not
included in the Warren’s database. Therefore, data on these companies had to
be hand-collected separately. We focused on the two major players –AT&T and
Verizon – as these two together accounted for over 90% of the market share of
30 E.g., Governor Jon Corzine. The then Governor of New Jersey’s statement when signing the
relevant bill stated: ‘The power of competition can improve quality and lower prices. Under the
legislation signed today authorizing new cable franchises, New Jersey cable television customers
will soon see the benefits of competition.’ (U.S. Fed News, August 2006)
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Telcos in the Cable TV market in 2010 according to the Frost & Sullivan online
database.31,32 There are two limitations of our hand-collected data. First, we
are able to reliably assess the presence of AT&T and Verizon only at the county
level and not at the individual community level. Thus, to the extent that some
communities within a given county were not served by these Telcos, our data
overstates entry at the community level. However, because this measurement
error is unlikely to be correlated with reform status, we do not expect this to bias
our estimates of the effect of reforms on entry. Second, we were only able to
obtain data on presence of AT&T and Verizon in 2010. Because we know that
TV service was launched byVerizon in late 2005 (Reardon [2005b]), andAT&T
in early 2006 (Reardon [2006]), we can bound the entry dates as being between
2005 and 2010. In our analyses, we check robustness to assuming alternative
entry dates for these Telcos.
VI(i). Effect of Reforms on Entry
To find out whether the reforms led to greater entry by cable companies or Tel-
cos, first we examine summary statistics on the fraction of communities with
either form of entry in 2004 and 2010 (Appendix Table A9). We find that there
was significantly more entry in the states that reformed between 2005 and 2008
(39.1%) relative to the non-reformed states (25.8%). The data show that the bulk
of the entry, as well as the source of the difference between reformed and non-
reformed states, come from Telcos. In fact, there was only modest new entry
by cable operators (2.3% overall) between 2004 and 2010, and the difference
between recently reformed states and non-reformed states, while positive, was
modest (2.4% versus 2.1%). Thus, consistent with the anecdotal evidence on lob-
bying behavior of Telcos (e.g., Reardon [2005a], Haugsted [2006], Sura [2006],
Sher [2008]), the reforms appear to have facilitated greater entry by Telcos in
reformed states.
Although these summary differences are strongly suggestive, differential entry
rates could be due to differences in trends for demographic or market struc-
ture characteristics. To control for these factors, in Table VI we examine a
linear propensity model of entry by either a cable overbuilder or by a Telco.
As noted above, we do not have data on precisely when either AT&T or Veri-
zon entered a given market. In the absence of such information, we assume in
the baseline case that all of the Telco presence in 2010 occurred in 2008. Sub-
sequently, we also consider alternative scenarios assuming all entry occurred
31 Specifically, at the end of 2010Verizon FiOS had 3.203 million customers,AT&T U-verse had
2.504 million customers, and all other Telcos combined had 0.611 million customers. That gives
Verizon and AT&T a combined market share in 2010 among Telcos of 90.3%.
32 For Verizon, we consulted: http://www.consumerfiber.com/fios-availability - This site ‘was
developed for the sole purpose of informing consumers about FiOS and other emerging fiber-
optic technologies.’ For data on AT&T, we consulted AT&T’s own webpage: http://www.att-
services.net/att-u-verse/availability/
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TABLE VI
REFORMS’ EFFECT ON ENTRY – LINEAR PROPENSITY MODEL
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline: Assuming 2008 year of entry for Telcos
Year of reform 0.0202 0.0247+ 0.0277+
(1.21) (1.48) (1.67)
Post-reform 0.0824∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(1.77) (2.37) (2.48)
Alternative 1: Assuming 2006 year of entry for Telcos
Year of reform 0.0531+ 0.0678∗∗ 0.0703∗∗
(1.61) (2.09) (2.17)
Post-reform 0.0767∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(2.29) (3.57) (3.66)
Alternative 2: Assuming 2007 year of entry for Telcos
Year of reform 0.0540 0.0628 0.0665
(1.16) (1.37) (1.45)
Post-reform 0.0938∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(1.95) (2.72) (2.81)
Alternative 3: Assuming 2009 year of entry for Telcos
Year of reform 0.00991 0.0135 0.0167∗
(1.01) (1.43) (1.82)
Post-reform 0.0560∗ 0.0761∗∗ 0.0795∗∗
(1.71) (2.34) (2.53)
Demographic controls N Y Y
Controls for market structure N N Y
Number of observations 48,280 39,067 37,745
R-squared 0.17 0.27 0.27
|
Notes: The dependent variable in this analysis is a dummy variable set to 1 if there is an overbuild in that community
or if either AT&T or Verizon provides cable service to any community within that county. In the absence of precise
information regarding the year of entry byAT&T orVerizon in these communities, we assume that all entry by Telcos
occurred in 2008 for the baseline. The results if we assume that all entry took place either in 2006 or in 2007 or in
2009 are presented as alternatives 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The regressions are estimated on cable head-ends, as entry
is observed at that level. There are approximately 6,000 cable head-ends in the U.S. All regressions include state and
year fixed effects. Demographic controls: Personal per capita income (and its square), population density (and its
square), the rate of household growth, the fraction of the population aged between 5 and 18, and the local wage. All
of these controls are available at the county level and are introduced in log form. The list of demographic controls
also includes controls for the size of the average cable system (measured in terms of number of subscribers per cable
system in the state) and the DMA rank. Controls related to market structure: Number of national subscribers, the
share of state subscribers for the company providing service in that community, and a dummy that is set to 1 whenever
the local company is vertically affiliated with a content service provider. Robust t statistics, clustered by state, in
parentheses + p < 0.15, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
in 2006 (Alternative 1), 2007 (Alternative 2), or 2009 (Alternative 3). Across
all scenarios, we find significantly higher difference-in-differences entry rate
in reformed states relative to non-reformed states. The magnitude of the effect
ranges from 7.95% (under alternative 3) to 13.8% (in alternative 2).
Thus, based on the evidence inAppendix TableA9 and TableVI, we conclude
that there was indeed more entry in reformed states following the reforms.
VI(ii). Limit Pricing or Price Competition: Effect of Actual or Increased Threat
of Entry?
The results in Section VI(i) confirm that the reforms resulted in a signifi-
cantly greater amount of entry in reformed states, with 40.7% of communities
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experiencing entry by 2010 compared to 26.5% for the non-reformed states
(Column (6) of Table A9).
As discussed in Section III, price declines following reductions in entry bar-
riers could arise in theory for two reasons. One, in the monopoly or Cournot
models discussed in Sutton ([1991], Ch. 2), there would be price declines due
to increased competition in the post-entry stage. On the other hand, in models
by Milgrom and Roberts [1982b] or Klemperer [1987], the reduction in entry
barriers could lead to ‘limit pricing,’ i.e., ex ante price cuts by incumbents as
a means to deter entry (by signaling lower costs in the former model and by
locking in potential customers in the presence of switching costs in the latter).
In this context, it is interesting to examine whether our baseline results of price
decline for ‘Basic’service are driven by larger average price declines in reformed
states caused bygreater entry, orwhether the reforms induced ex ante price reduc-
tions by incumbents in response to a greater threat of entry (as predicted by limit
pricing models).
We address this question in Table VII. In columns (1) and (2), we drop all
observations on cable overbuilds; thus if these new entrants were particularly
aggressive in terms of price cuts, the exclusion of this sub-sample helps isolate
the behavior of incumbent cable operators.33 We find the results in columns (1)
and (2) similar to the baseline results. Although this is not surprising given that
cable overbuilds constitute only 3.5% of the sample in 2010 (see Column (4) in
Table A9), nevertheless it suggests that incumbent pricing behavior was indeed
affected by the reforms.
We examine the more interesting question of whether there was price reduc-
tion by incumbents prior to/without actual entry in Columns (3), (4), (5) and (6).
In columns (3) and (4), we exclude all communities that had more than one cable
(i.e., wireline) service provider. In columns (5) and (6) we exclude communities
with more than one service provider, whether those were cable (i.e., wireline)
companies or either of the two major Telcos.34 We find that effects are in fact
stronger when we focus only on communities without entry; the coefficient esti-
mate suggests a decline of 6.57% in column (6) relative to the baseline effect
of 5.78% (in column (4) of Table IV). Note that we exclude communities with
entry from both reformed and non-reformed states; thus the results in columns
(3) to (6) suggest that incumbents in reformed states reduced prices more than
incumbents in non-reformed states following a decline in barriers to entry.
Finally in columns (7) and (8) we restrict the sample to communities that expe-
rienced actual entry; the results here suggest greater price declines in reformed
states, but themagnitudes are smaller and statistically insignificant. This is unsur-
prising; changes in upfront sunk costs of entry induced by the reforms should not
impact post-entry behavior of competing firms (except to the extent of deterring
a third entrant, which is very rare in the data). In fact, this result is reassuring,
33 Note that our data do not include price observations for Telco entrants.
34 We exclude from the analysis all communities where there was a Telco entry by 2010.
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in the sense that if omitted shocks were causing the strong declines in reformed
states, we could have expected to see equal-sized effects even conditional on
entry.
Overall, the evidence in TableVII suggests strong ex ante responses by incum-
bents for ‘Basic’ service, consistent with the models of Milgrom and Roberts
[1982b] and Klemperer [1987], and contradicting the perfect information model
of Milgrom and Roberts [1982a].
VII. CONTROLLING FOR CORRELATED SHOCKS: A SAMPLE-SPLIT
(TRIPLE-DIFFERENCE) TEST
Although the standardDID approachwe use controls for state-level fixed omitted
variables and our tests in SectionV(iii) suggest no bias from pre-existing trends,
the DID results could still be affected by unobserved time-varying state-level
shocks correlated with reform status. For example, if some unobserved demo-
graphic or market trend impacted cable pricing and was different between the
reformed and non-reformed states, this could potentially bias our analysis.
One potential source of bias is entry by Direct Broadcast Service (‘DBS’)
providers. While we do not have direct information on DBS providers (they are
not covered in the Warren’s data), other secondary sources suggest no differen-
tial trend in DBS entry across states. As Crawford [2008] notes, by 2003, before
the start of our sample in 2004, DBS availability was pervasive and prices were
generally similar across markets. TheAnnual Reports of DISH Network Corpo-
ration and the DIRECTV Group also confirm their availability across the entire
continental U.S. For example, the Annual Report for 2000 for DISH Network
states that:
As of December 31, 2000, approximately 5.26 million households subscribed
to DISH Network programming services. We now have six DBS satellites in
orbit which enable us to offer over 500 video and audio channels, together
with data services and high definition and interactive TV services, to con-
sumers across the continental United States through the use of a small satellite
dish.(p. 1).
Likewise the 2001 Annual Report for DISH Network states that: ‘DIRECTV
has launched six high powered DBS satellites and has 46 DBS frequencies that
are capable of full coverage of the continental United States.’(p. 14).
Given the pervasive availability of DBS over our sample period, 2004–2010,
we expect included time dummies to control for potential effects of increased
DBS penetration in our analysis, as we do not expect systematic differences
in the spread of DBS between reformed and non-reformed states. Finally as
Bolema [2008] notes, in contrast to the regulatory regime for cable compa-
nies, companies providing DBS services do not need franchises from local
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governments.35 Therefore, we do not expect the deregulation of the franchising
process to have any impact on the behavior of the DBS providers.
Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out incidental differences in trends
of DBS penetration across states, or differential trends in other relevant
variables unobserved by us. To try to address this concern, we consider exploit-
ing within-state differences in the strength of entry threats.36 The Milgrom-
Roberts/Klemperer models would suggest that costly entry deterrence strategies
are more valuable in locations where the threat of entry is stronger, so that
incumbent cable companies are more likely to respond by cutting prices in such
communities.
Specifically, we examine responses for incumbents operating in a county
where one of the largest overbuilders is already in operation. We expect the
largest price drops to occur in those communities that are geographically ‘close’
to a community already served by one of the top overbuilders. This approach
rests on the intuitive assumption that it is easiest for cable overbuilders to expand
into geographically proximate locations (Seamans [2013]). Building off of an
existing footprint allows the overbuilder to spread the fixed costs of building a
video delivery platform and take advantage of economies of scale in customer
service, maintenance, and repair. There is also anecdotal evidence supporting
this assumption. For example, in its 2005 Annual Report, RCN, one of the top
three overbuilders in the country, describes its strategy as: ‘RCN will continue
to seek opportunities to increase its network footprint within and adjacent to
its existing market clusters.’We can thus say that communities located near an
aggressive overbuilder are more likely to experience entry, and cable franchising
deregulation that allows for a state-wide franchise make such entry even more
likely to occur.
To operationalize this idea of largest or aggressive overbuilders, we look at
the top ten companies with the highest number of subscribers belonging to over-
built communities. In classifying companies as overbuilders or not, we set a
threshold that at least 30% of a company’s subscribers must reside in overbuilt
communities. The threshold is chosen in order to exclude large incumbent ser-
vice providers such as Comcast Communications, Inc. and Time Warner Cable
for whom less than 3% of their subscribers reside in overbuilt communities.
The final list of companies including the top ten overbuilders is comprised of
the following companies: WideOpenWest (WOW) LLC, RCN Corp., Knology,
Inc., Block Communications, Inc., Armstrong Group of Companies, WaveDivi-
sion Holdings LLC, Tacoma Public Utilities, Millennium Digital Media LLC,
Broadstripe, and Qwest. Of these, the first three and Armstrong Group of Com-
panies belong to the list of top 25 cable companies in theU.S. Cumulatively these
35 This stems at least in part because there are no right-of-way issues regarding the provision of
DBS in a community, unlike the provision of service by cable or telecom companies.
36 We note that our approach, though developed independently, is similar to that used in
contemporaneous work by Seamans [2013].
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top ten overbuilders account for 44% of all subscribers who reside in overbuilt
communities in our data.
We label any county where one of the top ten overbuilders is in operation
as ‘County has a top 10 overbuilder.’ Note that not all of the cable systems
operated by these so-called overbuilders are overbuilds; indeed, in many cases,
the cable systems run by these companies are the only cable system in opera-
tion in a given community. However, because at least 30% of their subscribers
reside in overbuilt communities, these companies are likely to have a reputation
within the industry as overbuilders whether or not a particular cable system is
an overbuild.37
The sample-split regression results for ‘Basic’service are presented in columns
(1) through (3) of Table VIII and those for ‘Expanded Basic’ service are pre-
sented in columns (4) through (6). To conserve space, the regression results for
only the most complete specification that includes controls for demographics,
market structure, and the number of channels are reported.
Comparing results in columns (1) and (2), we find that the magnitude of the
price decline is larger by about 11.85% in counties where a top ten overbuilder is
present. To focus exclusively on incumbent responses to a threat of entry (rather
than actual entry), in Column (3) we exclude communities where there is an
actual overbuild. This yields lower estimates, but the decline is still about twice
as large compared to communities in counties where a top ten overbuilder is
absent.
We repeat the analysis for ‘Expanded Basic’ service in Columns (4) to (6).
These results are also consistent with what we find for ‘Basic’ service, again
reaffirming the importance of a higher threat of entry for the reaction by incum-
bents. While individual estimates are not statistically significant, we find that
there is a notable difference in the magnitude and signs of the coefficients. In
particular, there is a 9.2% decline in price (in Column (5)) for high threat-of-
entry counties, while there is a 3.6% increase (in Column (4)) for counties in
which top ten overbuilders are absent. Excluding those communities which have
actually experienced entry does not change the results significantly, as we find
a 10.2% decline in this sample as well.
To the extent that within-state shocks correlated with reforms do not vary
across counties with and without a top ten overbuilder, these results confirm
that there was indeed a significant effect of the reform on incumbent pricing
behavior. In particular, because DBS entry is only limited by geographic factors
such as terrain and elevation (Goolsbee and Petrin [2004]) which are unlikely to
37 A pictorial representation of our approach towards analyzing heterogeneity of impact across
communities is provided in Appendix Figure A1. Our approach examines the sample of commu-
nities Y 1 and Y 2 in the reformed and non-reformed states before and after reform, which yields a
difference-in-differences (DID) estimate for communities neighboring a top 10 overbuilder (com-
munities in counties of type A). If incumbents are indeed responding to the greater threat of entry,
we expect the DID estimate for this sample to be greater than the DID effect for the sample of
communities in counties of type B where the threat of entry is lower.
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vary systematically between top 10 overbuilder counties and other counties, the
results here suggest that incumbents responded specifically to the greater threat
of entry in reformed states.
As a check on the economic meaningfulness of these differential declines in
price for communities with specifically higher threat of entry, we also undertook
a similar sample-split test for number of consumers subscribing to the two tiers
of service. Results presented inAppendix TableA10 show substantial responses
to the higher price declines in high threat-of-entry counties. For ‘Basic’ service,
quantity responded by about 101 log points (in column (3) of Table A10) to the
10.6% decline in prices (in Column (3) of Table VIII). Number of consumers
subscribing to ‘Expanded Basic’ also increased by 77 log points (in column (6)
of Table A10) in response to a 10.2% decline in prices (in Column (6) of Table
VIII). Both increases in the number of subscribers are statistically significant at
the 5% level (or stronger).
Taken together, the results from Table VIII and Table A10 suggest that, fol-
lowing the reforms, incumbents cut prices significantly (and signed up more
consumers) in counties where the threat of entry was relatively higher, consis-
tent with the reforms increasing the threat of entry, and consistent with ex ante
price cutting predicted by models of the type in Milgrom and Roberts [1982b]
and Klemperer [1987].38
VIII. EXTENSIONS
VII(i). Effects of Franchising Reforms on Quality of Service
Our paper has primarily focused on the change in prices following the enactment
of these franchising reforms. However, the quality of service plays an important
role in the user experience and given that one of the goals of these reforms was to
improve the quality of cable service (e.g. see footnote 30), in this section of the
paper, we examine how the quality of service was affected by the reforms. Given
that quality is a complex multidimensional object, we focus on a few different
measures: the number of channels, the number of channels distributed nationally
via satellite (also known as satellite channels), the number of channels within the
top ten and within the top twenty most popular channels. We present the results
for ‘Basic’ Service obtained using a DID framework in Panel A of Table IX and
the results from a sample-split (triple difference) specification in Panel B of that
table. Results for ‘Expanded Basic’Service (omitted for brevity) generally show
38 As noted in Section V(iv), the results from the triple-difference tests in this section provide
further reassurance that the baseline effects were not spuriously induced by measurement error
stemming from prices being infrequently updated in theWarren’s database. While it is unlikely that
errors associated with entries being updated were correlated with state-level reform status, it is even
less likely that such errors would be systematically correlated with whether or not a community was
adjacent to an overbuilder in a reformed state relative to a non-reformed state.
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small and insignificant changes for these quality measures in the post-reform
period.
As the coefficients in PanelA of the table suggest, there were modest improve-
ments in the quality of service following the enactment of these reforms, although
the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. Consistent with the spirit
of the sample-split results presented earlier in TableVIII, we find from the analy-
sis in Panel B that there were larger improvements in the quality of service in
those communities where a top ten overbuilder was present in that county. These
observations hold across all of the different measures of quality that we con-
sider.39 Our results are consistent with Chu [2010], who finds that satellite entry
typically causes incumbent cable firms to raise quality and lower prices, where he
measured quality as the number of channel offerings in the most comprehensive
packages.
VIII(ii). Effects of Franchising Reforms on the Prices of Broadband Service
Given that the goal of these franchising reforms was to promote competition
in the cable TV industry, our primary focus in this paper has been on prices of
the two most common tiers of cable service – ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic.’
However, households will often purchase bundled packages of video, Internet
access, and telephone services. While the triple bundle was first offered in 2004
by Cablevision at the start of our sample period, by the end of 2013, 43.3 per cent
of cable customers subscribed to a triple-play bundle comprising video, Inter-
net access, and telephone services (FCC [2015], p. 45). Therefore, our analysis
may overstate the welfare gains from these franchising reforms if there were
increases in the price of Internet access and/or telephone services.Although data
limitations (the lack of data on prices of telephone services) prevent us from
addressing this issue to our complete satisfaction, we can offer some remarks
regarding the changes in the price of Internet access as those data are available
in the Warren’s dataset.
In particular, inAppendixTablesA11 andA12we examine the price of internet
service, either alone or when combined with ‘Basic’ service or when combined
with ‘Expanded Basic’ service. In Table A11, we examine prices in a DID
framework while in Table A12, we examine the results in a sample-split (triple
difference) framework. In the interest of brevity, the results involving sample
39 We also examined how the availability of High Definition (HD) channels might have changed
following the enactment of the reforms but, because of severe data limitations, we are unable to
arrive at any definitive conclusions. Of the 2,928,439 channels across all accounts, all years, and
all tiers of service, only 34,897 or 1.2% of all channels were reported to be HD channels as per the
Warren’s dataset. As a result, in regressions that examine variation in the number of HD channels,
the coefficients of interest on the ‘Post-reform’ dummy are far from statistical significance. We find
no evidence based on those estimates of a deterioration in quality in the form of a drop in the number
of HD channels on either the ‘Basic’ or the ‘Expanded Basic’ tier of service following the reforms.
As noted by a referee, potential competition induced by the reformmay have impacted other margins
of interest such as customer service or equipment quality, which we unfortunately do not have data
to study directly.
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splits are drawn from the most complete set of specifications which include year
and state dummies, demographic controls, and controls for market structure.
As these coefficients in columns (1) through (3) of Table A11 suggest, there
were large declines in the price of internet service in the range of 10–18%
following the enactment of these reforms, although the coefficients are gener-
ally statistically insignificant. Also when we construct a hypothetical bundle of
‘Basic’ and internet services, we see a statistically significant drop in prices fol-
lowing these reforms while a bundle comprised of ‘Expanded Basic’and internet
services shows a statistically insignificant decline.The results (inTableA12) sug-
gest larger declines in prices in those communities where a top ten overbuilder
was present in the county, regardless of whether we examine the price of (a)
stand-alone internet service or bundles of (b) ‘Basic’ and internet services or (c)
‘Expanded Basic’ and internet services. While data limitations prevent us from
examining other margins of interest such as the speed of internet access, we
view these results in TablesA11 andA12 as additional evidence that the reforms
enhanced competition and consumer welfare in the market for internet services
as well.
VIII(iii). Robustness to Using Propensity-Score Matching DID
One potential concern that could bias any analysis of cable franchising reforms is
that these may have been endogenously driven by unobserved state-level factors
that could be correlated with analyzed outcomes. Our DID approach addresses
potential bias from state-level fixed variables, and we have provided a number
of additional checks that address this issue.40
In this section, we undertake an additional test to control for potential endo-
geneity of reforms using a two-step matching procedure from the labor market
program evaluation literature which echoes elements of the approach to address
endogeneity of market structure in the empirical IO literature (for example,
Mazzeo [2002], and Manuszak and Moul [2008]). In the latter papers, the
estimates from a first stage market structure model are used to construct a
control function that addresses potential endogeneity of the error term in the
second stage regression of price (or other outcomes) on cross-sectional differ-
ences in market structure, where omitted unobserved location fixed effects could
induce significant bias. Because of the staggered introduction of the reforms and
availability of panel data, in our context the main sources of bias are likely to be
40 A key strength of the difference-in-differences (DID) approach we use is that in all our spec-
ifications, we are able to include state fixed effects, which eliminate all time-invariant state-level
factors that might bias our estimates. In Section V(iii), we confirm that our DID effects were not
impacted by pre-existing trends as trends in prices for both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services
were similar across reformed and non-reformed states. Furthermore, robustness checks with cable
system fixed effects or community level fixed effects that were presented in Table V address the
possibility of time-invariant factors that vary at the cable system level or at the community level
biasing our estimates. Finally, our sample-split (triple-difference) test controls for potential state-
level shocks that may be correlated with both the introduction of the reforms and cable prices (or
other outcomes).
© 2017 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
552 SUTIRTHA BAGCHI AND JAGADEESH SIVADASAN
controlled for by state (or other location-specific) fixed effects. Nevertheless, we
mimic the spirit of their approach using the matching difference-in-differences
approaches proposed in the labor literature (e.g., Heckman, Ichimura and Todd
[1997]; Behrman, Cheng andTodd [2004]) which allows for selection into ‘treat-
ment’ (franchising reforms in our case) based on anticipated gains from the treat-
ment, provided assignment to treatment does not predict changes in outcome con-
ditional on the (observables used to construct) propensity score (Todd [2008]).
In the first step of this two-step process, we estimate a model that predicts
the probability of these franchising reforms being passed at the state level.
The predicted probability of reform is then used to split the overall sample of
reformed and non-reformed states into different groups. In the second step of the
estimation, when the price regressions are estimated, we introduce propensity
group-year specific fixed effects, to non-parametrically match on the propensity
score. Thus by using this two-step approach, we allow prices in states belonging
to the group with the highest probability of reform to evolve differently from
prices in states that belong to groups with lower probabilities of reform. As a
result, we no longer compare all reformed states with all non-reformed states, but
only reformed and non-reformed states that appear similar to each other based
on factors that predict the likelihood of a state reforming its cable franchising
laws.
For the first stage, presented in Appendix Table A13, we turn to the political
economy of these reforms. Previous work done by us suggests that population
density was a key factor, with states with higher population densities more likely
to pass these reforms.41 However, at the time these reformswere being debated in
state legislatures, there were concerns expressed by legislators representing rural
communities that their constituents would not benefit from the reforms. Under
the nominal build-out requirements of the state-wide franchises, they feared that
companies would cherry-pick and target only urban areas with higher popula-
tion densities.42 Indeed, we find that states with relatively high rural populations
exhibiting large variations in population density were less likely to pass these
reforms. Finally, building on a literature in political economy that suggests polit-
ical competition induces the adoption of pro-growth policies (Besley, Persson,
and Sturm [2010]), we introduce variables that proxy for the extent of political
competition in the state legislature and find support for that hypothesis too.
Next we use the first stage model to generate the likelihood of reform and use
those predicted probabilities to split the sample of reformed and non-reformed
states into three distinct groups.43 We then introduce group-year specific fixed
41 This may have stemmed from the expectation of lawmakers that reforms would be more likely
to induce economically viable entry in densely populated states.
42 For example, Senator KathleenVinehout (D) fromAlma,Wisconsin, expressed fears ‘her rural
constituents will be ignored because the proposed bill does not have strong build-out requirements’
(Davidoff, [2007]).
43 We split the 46 states that did not reform or reformed between 2005 and 2008 into three groups,
characterizing them as having the ‘Lowest likelihood of reform’or a ‘Moderate likelihood of reform’
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effects in the second-stage regressions, with price on the various tiers of ser-
vice as the dependent variable. The results obtained with this two-step approach
(Appendix Tables A14 and A15) are similar to those reported thus far and con-
firm that there were declines of approximately 6% in the price of ‘Basic’ service
following these reforms, with no statistically significant changes to the price
of ‘Expanded Basic’ service. The sample-split results also hold up under this
two-step estimation procedure.
IX. DISCUSSION OF RESULTSAND CONCLUSION
We investigate the effect of state-level cable franchising reforms. We find
difference-in-differences decline in the price of ‘Basic’ service of approximately
5.5 to 6.8% following the reforms. We also find evidence of significantly more
entry, particularly by telecom companies, following the reforms. We find that
DID price declines occurred even in counties which did not experience new
entry. Furthermore, we find that the magnitude of decline in prices was larger
in counties with a greater threat of entry (identified using presence of a top ten
overbuilder in the county). The price reduction could be thought of as a direct
5.5% to 6.8% gain in consumer surplus relative to expenditure for ‘Basic’ only
customers; a simple back of the envelope estimation yields implied aggregate
dollar gains in consumer welfare for ‘Basic’ only consumers of about $5.72
million per month.44
While the magnitude of the average effect of the reforms is modest, our find-
ings are noteworthy for a number of reasons. One, our robust finding of decline
in price for ‘Basic’ service contrasts to the null effect on price (or consumer wel-
fare through improved quality) of the Federal Cable Act of 1992 (which had the
stated objective of controlling cable price increases), carefully documented by
Crawford [2000]. Thus, these state-level reforms intended to reduce entry barri-
ers appear to have been more effective in controlling prices than the direct price
regulation of the Cable Act of 1992. Two, the decline in price is notably larger
in communities facing a higher threat of entry (where the upfront sunk costs for
potential entrants are lower). This suggests that the impact of the reforms, which
reduced the hassle and costs associated with negotiating local franchises, may
have been moderated by the need for significant upfront sunk costs for entrants.
Finally, we provide evidence for the effect of a threat of entry on incumbent
behavior which, as Goolsbee and Syverson [2008] note, has received much less
or the ‘Highest likelihood of reform.’We assign states that reformed prior to 2005 into an entirely
separate fourth group. Our results are invariant to modest changes in the number of groups and/or
to including states that reformed before 2005 in the first-stage estimation.
44 Average monthly price for ‘Basic’ service across all states for 2010 is $19.95 (from the
summary statistics in Table III). The number of consumers who subscribe only to ‘Basic’ ser-
vice in 2010 in the nineteen states that have reformed is 4,959,681. Therefore, neglecting any
change in the number of subscribers following the enactment of reform and using the 5.78%
price decline in column (4) of Table IV, the approximate aggregate consumer welfare gain
=P ∗ Q = (0.0578 ∗ $19.95) ∗ 4, 959, 681 = $5.72 million/month.
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attention in the empirical literature, relative to theoretical and policy debate on
the topic. Specifically, our findings are consistent with models of limit pricing
by incumbents (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts [1982b] and Klemperer [1987]), and
contrary to models that predict no change in incumbent behavior absent actual
entry (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts [1982a], or the Bertrand competition model in
Sutton [1991]).
We find some evidence of an increase in quality of service for the ‘Basic’
category following the reforms, so that the observed price declines are not offset
or explained by reduced quality of service. We also find some evidence of a
decline in price for internet services. Data limitations restrict analysis of other
important outcomes such as quality of customer service or installed equipment,
which could have been potentially impacted as well.
One caveat to be kept in mind when interpreting our results relates to data
quality concerns with the Warren’s TV Factbook database used in this study
(Crawford and Yurukoglu [2012]; Martin and Yurukoglu [2016]). While we
undertake a number of checks to address that concern and find our baseline
results for both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ cable prices to be robust, our
results may be biased towards zero because of data quality issues and hence
should be interpreted as such.45 Though we do not find any systematic change in
the estimated effect in robustness checks designed to address data quality issues,
nevertheless measurement error due to poor data quality could be one explana-
tion whywe do not find any DID decline in the price of ‘Expanded Basic’service
on average.
Additionally, we offer two alternative speculative explanations based on dif-
ferent theories of ex ante price reductions. One, as in the Milgrom and Roberts
[1982b] model, price reductions serve as signals of underlying marginal costs. It
could be the case that ‘Basic’ cable prices provided a sufficiently credible signal
of true costs for incumbents, and so they responded to the increased threat of entry
following reforms by cutting prices only for the ‘Basic’ tier. Two, it is possible
that the goal of cutting prices was to lock-in consumers as in Klemperer [1987].
As discussed earlier, it is plausible that the price declines were accompanied
by fixed-term contracts with early termination penalties discouraging customers
from switching. Because customers of the cheaper ‘Basic’ service tier may be
more likely to be price sensitive, they may also be the ones more likely to switch
if new entrants were to offer lower prices. Thus, it could be rational for incum-
bent cable companies to offer lower prices for the product segment with more
price sensitive customers.46 Data limitations prevent us from further analysis
45 This observation is consistent with the largermagnitude of price effectswe findwhen restricting
analysis to markets with updated data.
46 Comparing results for ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ prices and quantities in Tables VIII and
A10 suggests that ‘Basic’ service may have a more elastic demand. In particular, in col. (3) of Table
VIII a 10.6% decline in price yields a quantity response of 101 log points (in col. (3) of Table A10),
whereas for ‘Expanded Basic’ in col. (6) of Table VIII, a similar price decline of 10.2% yields a
smaller increase in quantity of 77 log points (in col. (6) of Table A10).
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that could have shed more light on this finding. For example, information on
contract terms could have allowed us to explore whether incumbents tried to
lock-in consumers using longer contract periods and/or larger early termination
fees.
Cable systems are among one of relatively few services where U.S. consumers
have few choices. Our finding that there is significantly more entry in reformed
states suggests that the local franchising process which vests authority in local
franchising authorities does play a role in limiting competition. Our results sug-
gest that adoption of the franchising deregulation in the 27 states that are yet to
adopt these reforms could boost entry and improve welfare.
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